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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis is a work of American intellectual history that attempts to explain how 
the foreign policy of the United States was concocted and shaped in the late 20th century.  
Specifically, it focuses on the end period of the Cold War from 1975 to 1985, and 
Soviet/American relations concerning the issues of détente, arms control, and national 
defense.  It examines American social and political trends as causal forces that played a 
role in the United States’ policy turn against détente with the Soviet Union, and the turn 
toward a posture of confrontation by the late 1970s.  Social trends included the changing 
mood and opinions of the American public, and the rise of a neo-conservative movement 
that increasingly relied on intellectuals, and think tanks, to promulgate and legitimize 
their ideas to the public and the political leadership simultaneously.   
 These social, intellectual, and political trends were evolving constants, they 
developed irrespective of changes in White House leadership.  As such, they account for 
many of the continuities in Soviet and national defense policy between the 
administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.  Continuity and the evolving 
spectrum of change that occurred during these years is the other major theme of this 
thesis.  The Carter and Reagan administrations are often thought of as having been 
dramatically different in their approaches to the Soviet Union.  However, this thesis 
attempts to illuminate that between these two administrations there was an evolving 
strategy that led the United States to Cold War victory.  A confluence of the domestic and 
the foreign, the governmental and the private, the social and the political accounted for 
the paradoxical changes and continuities during this time.                                     
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INTRODUCTION 
In Strategies of Containment, John Lewis Gaddis makes an especially useful 
observation about the beginning of the détente period.  It is useful because it provides a 
constructive way of looking at many periods and subjects in the history of American 
foreign relations.  Gaddis begins his chapter on “Nixon, Kissinger, and Détente” by 
observing the general world situation in 1968.  China had emerged from isolation and 
became increasingly confrontational with the Soviet Union.  The Soviets were poised to 
achieve numerical parity in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) with the United 
States, but at the same it time suffered with economic difficulties that demanded closer 
relations with the West.  In short, a confluence of geopolitical and economic realities 
shaped the birth of America’s détente policy with the Soviet Union.  As Gaddis puts it, 
“This ‘objective’ situation, then, probably would have produced major changes in 
American diplomacy, whoever entered the White House on January 20, 1969.”1       
   These outside world developments were linked to changing perceptions and 
appearances of this objective situation.  The emphasis on ideology as a major impediment 
to good, or at least relaxed, relations was discarded and foreign policy was determined 
based on what the most desirable appearances would be to allies and adversaries.  This 
translated into a willingness by Nixon and Kissinger to deal with communist regimes in 
China and Eastern Europe irrespective of their repressive nature and their ideology, 
which was so inimical to core American values.   
 The social and intellectual dimensions of this objective situation which led to the 
birth of détente have recently been impressively explored and analyzed by Jeremi Suri in 
                                                 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment : A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 273.    
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his book Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente.  In short, Suri’s 
thesis is that by 1968 the major world powers, including the United States, Soviet Union, 
and China, were facing such dramatic social upheavals in the form of various dissident 
movements and generalized social discontent that in response they began the 
international process that would come to be called détente as a way to fortify their 
domestic position.  As Suri writes, “The global disruption of 1968 grew from the 
declining ability of leaders to manufacture consent at home.”2  They used agreement with 
foreign adversaries to contain increasingly virulent internal pressures and deflect 
attention from domestic difficulties.  Leaders had to find new sources of power away 
from home with which to contain domestic critics and enemies.  President Nixon, “used 
the prospects of great power cooperation to argue that his opponents threatened 
international peace.”3  
 In describing the pressures and movements that led to détente, Suri articulates  
especially salient concepts that relate to the following thesis.  One is what he calls the 
“infrastructure” and “language” for dissent: the various protest movements, student 
groups, prominent iconoclasts, writers, artists, and musicians that organized, led, or 
inspired global dissent.  He discusses the manner in which these groups and individuals 
spoke, wrote, and demonstrated, what their agendas were, and how they ultimately 
influenced international politics.  Hence, Suri argues that détente was an initiative begun 
by those at the top but was ultimately motivated by pressures from the “bottom,” those 
forces outside of the official government decision-making apparatus.   
   
                                                 
2 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest : Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 2003) 166. 
3 Ibid 5. 
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 The following thesis attempts to finish the story and explain the death of detente 
by examining some of the same types of causal factors that Suri looks at in his work.  
This thesis will explain the counterrevolution of sorts to the policy changes that the 
turbulent 1960s had produced.  Like the forces that created détente, its rejection  was also 
largely influenced by organizations and individuals outside of governmental decision 
making structures who influenced and were influenced by, the changing moods in 
American society.  However, these groups and individuals were for the most part very 
different from the agitators of the 1960s, and they were motivated by different agendas 
and ideologies.   
 Related to these ideas, the thesis will also argue that instead of a sharp change in 
policy between the Carter and Reagan administrations, there was instead a spectrum of 
change that occurred along a continuum linking the Soviet policy of the two 
administrations.  This thesis accepts the commonly understood beginning of the détente 
period as lying in the Nixon years of 1968-69, with the high point reached in August 
1975, symbolized by the Helsinki Final Act.  What the thesis argues against is the widely 
held view that détente did not end until 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  
The reality is that, as early as 1975 important domestic and external events were 
precipitating important changes in the United States’ Soviet policy.  These changes led to 
a tacit return to a more traditional hard line containment posture as early as mid-1978.  
This change encompassed important links to the foreign and defense policies of Carter’s 
successor, Ronald Reagan.  Therefore, this thesis will focus on the years from 1975 to 
1985 and the changes and continuities that characterize Soviet-American relations during 
this time period.  Thus, the death of détente, and of initiatives like SALT, and the 
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resulting hard line against the Soviet Union was a process, a political evolution.  The 
process was shaped by a combination of the emerging international situation, and a new, 
infrastructure and language of dissent influencing policy that evolved during this time 
period. 
 Chapter one overviews the continuum of opposition to détente in the “long” 1970 
from 1968 to approximately 1983.  In doing so the early political origins of détente are 
explained, and 1975 is highlighted as a particularly crucial year in which a tipping point 
toward renewed confrontation occurred.  The Soviet’s international behavior and 
simultaneous defense build up and the role it played in feeding the fears of the American 
public, and lending credence to the arguments against détente is also examined.  In 
particular, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) is discussed as one of the most 
important anti-détente groups and how it influenced foreign policy.  In particular the 
CPD’s involvement in the CIA’s “Team B” project of the mid-1970s is discussed as a 
prime example.  The state of the American public’s mindset in the 1970s is also 
examined as another important causal factor in the turn back toward confrontation. 
 Chapter two elaborates on the significance of Team B in the creation of foreign 
policy during the Carter years.  Carter’s human rights focus and its relationship to détente 
is examined, and related to that issue, the importance of the Helsinki Final Act as an 
ultimately anti-détente measure.  This chapter also addresses the return to a much more 
ideological posture under Jimmy Carter that American foreign policy, and how this 
related to his human rights beliefs.  The significance of a concomitant rise in human 
rights politics in the United States, in the 1970s, is discussed here as well.  This chapter 
also examines the rising neo-conservative movement of the 1970s and how its critiques 
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of détente, and the SALT process, were expressed and promulgated, and how that critique 
began to filter upward into the Carter administration.  How this emerging critique 
translated into policy in the form of a modest incrementalism in defense expenditure and 
military modernization is also explained.   
 Chapter three focuses on the Soviet dimension of the move toward confrontation 
and examines how the intrinsic nature of the Brezhnev regime contributed to the death of 
the detente era.  The Soviet’s fundamentally different conceptions of what détente was 
supposed to mean play an important role in this regard.  The significance of Carter’s 
March 1977 arms control proposal, and the proposal’s connection to the efforts of 
conservative democrats like Senator Henry Jackson are explained here as well.  Emerging 
weapons technologies, and how they shaped Carter’s confidence in the defense related 
incrementalism of his administration is explained.  This chapter also addresses the 
marked shift toward a harder line with the Soviet Union by mid-1978 as away of 
illustrating the continuities part of the spectrum of change linking the Carter and Regan 
administrations.  The question of why Carter chose to make human rights such an 
important part of his international agenda and what the ultimate pitfalls and problems 
associated with this issue were.   
 Chapter four moves into the first term of the Reagan administration and examines 
how by this time the conservative revolt against détente and Cold War foreign policy 
dogma was achieving it greatest victory up to that time.  Specifically this chapter focuses 
on the influence of Stanford University’s Hoover Institute and its influence in some of 
Reagan’s most important policy decisions.  Links to the defense and foreign policy 
initiatives of Jimmy Carter are further explained and elaborated.   
  6
 Chapter five elaborates on the intellectual influences that inspired and guided 
Ronald Reagan’s vision of both the Strategic Defense Initiative and arms control.  The 
often unacknowledged link between these two is also explained.  The growth in 
awareness and literacy on nuclear and defense related matters by the general public is 
examined as well.  This is a cultural indication of how these issues were becoming of 
increasing concern by the late 1970s and continued into the early 1980s, and in part 
explains the overall issue of continuities addressed by this thesis.  This chapter also 
focuses on the significance of Paul Nitze’s return to government service, and his efforts 
on arms control, as it relates to the themes of change and continuity.      
 In addition to the themes of continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy, this 
thesis also is a work of American intellectual history.  It examines the important currents 
of thought and opinion during endgame period of the Cold War, from approximately 
1975 to 1985.  It attempts to explain the apparent intellectual paradoxes and 
contradictions during this period as they related to détente, arms control and 
Soviet/American relations generally speaking.  Moreover, this thesis also examines how 
groups and individuals, of apparently different political persuasions and agendas, often 
found common cause when their goals and concerns overlapped.  The basic, overall, 
question addressed here is : How did emerging political ideas, and social changes, during 
this period evolve into declaratory and operational government policy?   
 Important works related to this thesis include Raymond Garthoff’s Détente and 
Confrontation and The Great Transition which provide the most comprehensive and 
detailed examinations of the détente period and the Reagan years respectively.  
Garthoff’s works are conventionally political and diplomatic histories, with its detail of 
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diplomatic and defense policy the two books together imply the continuities discussed 
here.  Jeffrey Richelson’s article, “PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic 
Modernization Program,” in the June 1983 Journal of Strategic Studies focuses 
specifically on the military dimension of this thesis and the operational links are made 
more explicit.  Odd Arne Westad’s collection of essays, written by himself and other 
historians, The Fall of Détente: Soviet American Relations During the Carter Years, is a 
more recent work and contributes more of the American domestic political scene and 
Carter’s human rights focus to the subject.  Dan Caldwell’s, The Dynamics of Domestic 
Politics and Arms Control, focuses specifically on SALT II and the influence of public 
opinion and political opposition groups to the SALT ratification debate.   
 Recent scholarly articles were also key to the arguments of this thesis.  Thomas 
M. Nichols’ article “Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the U.S. Return to a Strategy 
of Confrontation,” in the June 2002 issue of Diplomacy and Statecraft explains Carter’s 
rejection of détente and the factors that motivated him to do so.  Two works that examine 
the nature of human rights politics in the 1970s, Carter’s relationship to that political 
trend, and the problems it posed for him are : Kenneth Cmiel’s “The Emergence of 
Human Rights Politics in the United States” from the December 1999 issue of The 
Journal of American History,  and David Skidmore’s “Carter and the Failure of Foreign 
Policy Reform” from the winter 1993-94 Political Science Quarterly.    
 Important works relating to the Soviet dimension of this issue are Harry 
Gelman’s, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente, Robin Edmond’s Soviet 
Foreign Policy During the Brezhnev Years, and Adam Ulam’s Dangerous Relations, both 
of which examine the problematic nature of the Brezhnev regime to détente.  Crucial 
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studies of American political interest groups, and neo-conservatism are John Ehrman’s 
The Rise of Neoconservatism, William C. Berman’s America’s Right Turn, and Oran P. 
Smith’s The Rise of Baptist Republicanism.  James Allen Smith’s The Idea Brokers and 
David Ricci’s The Transformation of American Politics are important works on the 
history and influence of American think tanks.   
 Recent general histories of the 1970s and 1980s were very helpful in 
contextualizing the main arguments of this thesis.  The most important of these are: 
Philip Jenkins’ Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties 
America, David Frum’s How We Got Here, and Bruce Schulman’s The Seventies: The 
Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics.   
 Coral Bell’s The Reagan Paradox, is an excellent anyalsis of the mindset of the 
Reagan administration, its foreign policy goals, and phililosphies.  Bell aptly explains the 
seemingly contradictory nature of Reagan’s decision making as his political view evolved 
from confrontation to negotiation and arms control.   
 However, the above works do not connect the social, political, domestic and 
external factors that account for the continuities between the Carter and Reagan 
administrations in a manner that focuses on connections in an explicit way.  Books by 
Jenkins, Frum, and Schulman come the closest, but their treatment is very broad and do 
not focus in detail on the evolution of Soviet/American relations.  This thesis is an 
attempt to synthesize the important insights of the above authors, and provide a 
conceptual matrix for explaining the multifaceted nature of American foreign policy in 
the Cold War.  In doing so, this thesis also seeks to add the body of American intellectual 
  9
history as well, by illustrating that the nation’s foreign policy concerns were as diverse an 
issue as any other in American history.                                                                 
      
 
 
     
CHAPTER 1 
A CONTINUUM OF OPPOSITION IN THE “LONG” 1970S          
 Aside from the more subtle political motivations for détente explained by Jeremi 
Suri, the most immediate impetus for both superpowers was the approaching parity in 
strategic nuclear forces that the Soviet Union was soon to achieve by the early 1970s with 
the United States.  The word détente means “a relaxation of tensions” but the two nations 
sought different goals from the process.  President Nixon hoped that the process would 
lead to Soviet assistance in ending the Vietnam War, attain for him personally a legacy as 
a peace president, and more generally provide a way of managing Soviet behavior and 
power.   
That power seemed clearly on the rise and was juxtaposed with America’s 
desperate final efforts in Vietnam.  In 1969, the Soviets surpassed the United States in 
numbers of ICBMs.  By 1973, the same year that U.S. ground forces were withdrawing 
from Vietnam, the Soviets successfully tested their first multi-warhead (MIRVed) 
ICBM.4  That same year the embargo on oil to the United States, ordered by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, resulted in dramatic increases in 
inflation and unemployment.  The combination of these economic setbacks and Soviet 
strategic parity made it difficult to justify increasing expenditures on the arms race.  More 
generally, detente was a method of crisis avoidance that established the political rules of 
the game through an agreed upon code of conduct.  In this sense Nixon and Kissinger 
                                                 
4 Thomas B. Cochran et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol.  IV : Soviet Nuclear Weapons (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1989) 10-11.   
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saw détente as, “a strategy, rather than as an objective; it was a means rather than a 
goal.”5   
 Détente’s relationship to arms control was fundamentally conservative, as 
symbolized by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations.  Conservative, 
not in the political sense, but rather in its goals of limiting, rather than reducing, nuclear 
weapons.  In short, SALT sought to cap the production of certain types of weapons, like 
ICBMs, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), and their warheads and limit 
developments of new weapons systems such as the cruise missile and modern bombers.  
 There was a commercial and cultural aspect to détente as well, codified in the 
“Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics” signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on May 29, 1972.  This 
agreement involved promises to expand cultural, scientific, and economic exchanges 
between the two nations.  It also outlined a code of conduct in which the two nations 
would “do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of 
nuclear war,” and “will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful 
means.”6       
 For the Kremlin, détente was a way to get the United States to accept Soviet 
political equality and henceforth their status as an equal world power.  In this respect, 
détente would “have helped manage the transition of the United States into a changing 
                                                 
5 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation : American – Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 
revised edition (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1994) 32.  See also: Henry Kissinger, The White 
House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979) 949 & 1143.  Kissinger describes détente as a 
strategy of “carefully calibrated measures” toward the Soviet Union that had “lured” Brezhnev into 
important concessions and agreements.  He also explains that détente depended on “a firm application of 
psychological and physical restraints and determined resistance to challenges.”  See also: Richard Nixon, 
The Real War, (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1980) 297.  Nixon describes both containment and 
détente as “defensive strategies designed to keep the Soviets from advancing and to keep World War III 
from escalating.”     
6 “Text of Basic Principles, May 29”  The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 66, 26 June 1972, 898-901. 
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world, one no longer marked by American predominance but by political parity of the 
Soviet Union with the United States that matched their military parity.”7  Simultaneously, 
they also sought Western trade credits, loans, and technology transfers.  Détente was also 
seen by the Soviets as a way of achieving the peaceful co-existence necessary both to 
bide time for the inevitable triumph of socialism and for the assistance of “national 
liberation” movements around the world that would increase their worldwide power and 
influnce.  In this sense peace was not the absolute Soviet goal of détente, peace was 
“waged” and “like war… is a continuation of policy.”8  In short, détente for the Soviets 
was a way to make the world safe for socialist revolution. 
 Nevertheless, nuclear weapons and arms control remained a major component of 
détente, so much so that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) became a major 
forum for U.S./Soviet relations itself, and was a process that, in Strobe Talbott’s words, 
“acquired an institutional mass that some political innovators might have considered dead 
weight but that served as a kind of deepwater anchor in Soviet – American relations.”9  
Regardless of whatever other motivations the two sides had for pursuing détente, the  
issue of nuclear weapons claimed the highest profile as the most obvious symbols of 
power and influence and, as such, the main point of contention within the general issue of 
détente.   
 Although Nixon and Kissinger did not use the term with any regularity until the 
early 1970s, the concept of détente had been officially articulated as early as 1967 in the 
Harmel Report, a NATO study that recognized a changing international situation, and the 
                                                 
7Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation : American – Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 
revised edition (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1994) 42. 
8 Ibid 44-51. 
9 Strobe Talbott, Endgame : The Inside Story of SALT II (New York: Harper &Row, 1979) 20. 
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oppurtunity to build a more stable relationship with the communist bloc.10  The report led 
to the first NATO studies of mutual force reductions and a general acknowledgement of 
interest in arms control.11  The need for slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was 
a subject of discussion throughout the 1960s, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, illustrated 
the need to reduce superpower tensions, but the Harmel Report reflected that by the late 
1960s these ideas had effectively moved past the debate stage and were becoming official 
matters of Western defense policy. 
 It did not take long for opposition to these ideas to emerge, and the year after the 
report was written retired commander of Strategic Air Command (SAC), Curtis LeMay, 
submitted his trademark blunt opinion on the subject of arms control.  In his book, 
America Is in Danger he asked his readers if in the near future, “will we look over our 
shoulders at our shrinking nuclear force, at our missing anti-ballistic missile system, and 
succumb to Kremlin demands?”12  LeMay’s main targets of criticism were defense 
intellectuals whom he derisively referred to as “the new thinkers” who advance “topsy- 
turvy doctrines of weakness to achieve security” and “stigmatize solid military 
experience and even uninformed military leaders in order to gain credence for the strange 
philosophy of weakness.”13  While contemptuous of defense intellectuals, he also 
acknowledged the increasing amount of influence they were having on defense-related 
                                                 
10 American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1967, (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1969) 
322-323.  Paragraph eight of this report, entitled “Future Tasks of the Alliance,” states that “The evolution 
of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to 
recognize the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement.”     
11 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 127-128. 
12 Curtis E. LeMay, America Is in Danger (New York : Funk & Wagnalls, 1968) 264.  It is worth noting 
that this book appeared during the same year that LeMay ran as George Wallce’s running mate in the 
presidential elections of 1968.    
13 Ibid, 268. 
  14
matters, and lamented the naïve, dangerous path they were leading the nation down in the 
face of a hostile and deceitful enemy whose nuclear strength was growing.   
 Even after the SALT I agreements were signed in May 1972, Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird gave optimistic, yet guarded, statements about the treaty.  He 
maintained that SALT I had been possible only through the United States’ determination 
to negotiate from strength, and admonished those listening that “we still need to keep on 
our guard” and announced a new program of modernization and improvement in U.S. 
strategic forces.14    
 By 1976 Paul H. Nitze, a member of the SALT negotiating team from 1969 to 
1974, was expressing an even more pessimistic assessment of where détente was taking 
the United States.  In an article entitled “Assuring Strategic Stability in An Era of 
Détente” in the January 1976 edition of Foreign Affairs, Nitze argued that under the 
existing SALT agreements the Soviet Union may very likely pursue and achieve strategic 
superiority.  He also asserted that the SALT II proposals based on the Vladivostok 
Accord, “would not provide a sound foundation for follow on negotiations under present 
trends.”15  This accord was an interim agreement on arms control reached by President 
Ford and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev until and actual SALT II 
negotiations began.  Nitze’s conclusions were based, in part, on the greater relative 
importance that the Soviets put on civil defense, reflecting their belief that nuclear 
conflict was likely and that such conflict was survivable.  His assessment of Soviet 
motivations for détente itself suggested that they had approached the process with a 
                                                 
14 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation : American – Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 
revised edition (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1994) 218. 
15 Paul H. Nitze “Assuring Strategic Stability in An Era of Détente”, Foreign Affairs Jan. 1976, Vol. 54, 
No. 2.    
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cynicism that sought advantage rather than parity.  In sum, Nitze felt that the SALT 
agreements and the pursuit of détente in general had placed the United States at risk of 
falling into a dangerously inferior position to the Soviet Union. 
 The article made such an impression that it was included in the text of a Senate 
hearing in April of 1976 on the issue of civil preparedness.  During that hearing, Nitze 
reiterated his views on the destabilizing effects of the Soviet civil defense program and 
the need for the United States to develop its own civil defense effort.  Also present during 
this hearing were other respected defense intellectuals, namely, Herman Kahn, Richard 
Garwin, and Wolfgang Panofsky.16  Nitze agreed with Herman Kahn’s estimate of a $300 
to $400 million program and seemed to believe that 300 million was a reasonable amount 
to spend for civil defense.  However, he disagreed sharply with his other colleagues, 
particularly with Wolfgang Panofsky.  Responding to Panofsky’s assertion that it would 
be an “abomination” for the U.S. to posses the relative nuclear capability that it possessed 
during the Cuban missile crisis, Nitze said, “I do not think the United States is the enemy.  
The enemy is a different enemy.  If we want to preserve the chance for peace in a decent 
world, we have got to go at this without the kind of an approach which appears to assume 
that the principal enemy is the Defense Department or those who think we ought to have 
an adequate security.”17  This statement was also a response to Richard Garwin, whom 
Nitze felt had questioned his motives for promoting civil defense.  The statement is 
telling when one considers that at first glance it seems that Nitze is referring only to the 
Soviet Union when he says “The enemy is a different enemy,” but he did not specify. 
                                                 
16 Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Defense Production : Civil Defense and 
Limited Nuclear War, 94th Congress, second session, April 28, 1976 (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1976).  
17 Ibid, 60.  
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Rather, when considered with the rest of the statement, the suggestion seems to be that 
those who disagree with “those who think we ought to have an adequate security,” in 
other words him, were not being realistic about national security.  In short, among 
America’s defense and foreign policy intelligentsia, battle lines were being drawn.          
 By 1980, on the eve of Ronald Reagan’s election to the presidency, the Russian 
dissident writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn declared that, “Communism will never be halted 
by negotiations or through the machinations of détente.  It can be halted only by force 
from without or by disintegration from within.”18  That was just one of many blunt 
statements from his book The Mortal Danger: How Misconceptions About Russia Imperil 
America.  Ironically, the book, as its title suggests, shares much in the way of general 
tone and sentiment with Curtis LeMay’s.  Like LeMay, Solzhenitsyn lambasted 
American diplomats and foreign policy intellectuals (calling out George Kennan and 
Henry Kissinger by name) as pretentious self-serving bureaucrats who succeeded only in 
deceiving Americans about the true nature of the Soviet government, which was 
irredeemably repressive to its own people and belligerent to the free world.  As David 
Frum points out, by 1978, even George McGovern, who in 1975 predicted that most of 
the Vietnamese refugees would eventually want to go back home, was calling for a U.S. 
invasion of Cambodia.19  By March of 1983 President Reagan was openly referring to the 
Soviet Union as an “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the world today.”  One would 
have to look back to the Truman years to find equally inflammatory rhetoric.          
                                                 
18 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Mortal Danger : How Misconceptions About Russia Imperil America (New 
York : Harper & Row, 1980) 70. 
19 David Frum, How We Got Here : The 70s Decade That Brought You Modern Life (For Better or Worse) 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000) 311.   
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 The salient point of the above examples is that opposition to détente began almost 
as soon as it was proposed and involved a wide range of people who were sometimes 
radically different in occupation, training, background, culture, place and time.  
Nevertheless, all of these voices were essentially saying the same thing: America is 
fooling itself by pursuing détente with a nation that is determined to maintain an 
adversarial relationship with the United States and is implacably hostile to America’s 
very existence.  Détente is putting America in an increasingly perilous position.  As the 
above examples illustrate as well, the certainty and passion of this sentiment seemed to 
increase throughout the period of the “long” 1970s from 1968 to 1983.    However, 1975 
was a crucial year when a confluence of world events, emerging American political 
movements, and American opinion, precipitated a tipping point in the growing doubts 
about détente, and laid the groundwork for a return to confrontation.         
 
    AMERICA IN THE MID-1970S 
     Isn’t that what a farmer has with his turkey until Thanksgiving Day? 
 
Ronald Reagan, giving his                
definition of détente (1978) 
 
A universal feeling, whether well or ill founded, cannot be safely 
disregarded.    
 
                   Abraham Lincoln  
   
 
 By 1975 it seemed apparent to many that while détente may have led to a 
relaxation of tensions between the superpowers, this did not translate into greater security 
for the United States.  Increasingly the entire philosophy of détente, and its main policy 
corollary SALT, was seen a Soviet attempt to dupe America until “Thanksgiving Day” 
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arrived, whenever the Soviets were ready to start carving.  In 1975 and 1976, some 
important themes began to emerge in American neoconservative writing, mainly the 
decline of U.S. power relative to the perceived growth in Soviet military spending and 
expansionist activity.  The growing neoconservatives movement saw a growing crisis as 
the nation’s leadership refused to face the reality of Soviet aggressive intentions and react 
appropriately, which for them meant taking a hard line, increasing defense spending.  
This neo-conservatism was the political child of the older conservatism championed in 
the 1950s and 60s by figures like William F. Buckley, who combined philosophies of 
limited government, free market capitalism, moral traditionalism and militant anti-
communism.20  It was a movement that grew from domestic concerns of abortion, school 
busing, drugs, and sexual promiscuity.  Not surprisingly, they often compared themselves 
to Winston Churchill, and their opponents to the Nazi appeasers of the 1930s.21  
Moreover, this was a sentiment shared not by just a few government insiders or 
intellectual elites, but increasingly the American public as well.22  In some respects world 
events seemed to support these fears.     
 The previous year saw the publication in the west of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s 
Gulag Archipelago, and the resulting publicity surrounding the book reminded 
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Americans of the brutal nature of Soviet communism.  Horrifying evidence of brutality 
and death under communist rule in Cambodia under Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge were 
increasingly being seen and heard in the West.  After South Vietnam fell in April 1975, 
approximately one million Vietnamese were brutalized and killed, and many were 
sentenced to “reeducation” camps from which some did not emerge until 1986.23  By 
1979 the Soviets had secured a major warm water naval and air force base at Cam Ranh 
Bay.  The Portuguese government had narrowly avoided being overthrown by 
communists, and in November 1975 was forced  to put down a left wing coup attempt by 
paratroopers and other soldiers.  During that same time Cuban troops were intervening in 
the civil war in Angola, and by January 1976 Cuba and the Soviet Union signed an 
agreement to provide weapons to Cuban troops in Angola.  In short, communism seemed 
to be gaining ground all over the world, presumably all at the direction of Moscow.24   
 As for the Soviets themselves, by 1975 it seemed evident they were indeed 
determined to pursue an improvement in their nuclear forces that flew in the face of the 
idea of parity as outlined by SALT I.  By the summer of 1973 they were flight testing a 
new generation of ICBMs with larger payloads, and with the ability to carry Multiple 
Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV), which reflected a significant 
technical breakthrough for them.  Moreover, in tests observed by U.S. analysts these 
Soviet MIRVs were clearly meant to destroy U.S. missile silos as a counterforce, rather 
than as a purely retaliatory weapon, indicating that the Kremlin was pursuing a war 
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winning capability rather than mutual deterrence.25  Expectations that SALT II would be 
finalized that year were thwarted by the issues of how to count U.S. cruise missiles under 
the treaty, and the Soviet’s new bomber, the Tu-22 “Backfire,” and whether it should be 
counted as a heavy bomber.  The Backfire would be a source of constant worry for U.S. 
defense planners throughout the 1970s.  When first deployed in 1974 it represented the 
most capable Soviet bomber to date; it could carry nuclear weapons, possessed super 
sonic, low level flight capabilities, and could possibly be refueled in flight, giving it 
intercontinental range.  The U.S. would not have an aircraft of similar overall capabilities 
until Strategic Air Command adopted the B-1B in 1986.  
 SALT negotiations had stalled but not been abandoned.  Instead they would be 
left in a strange kind of limbo until Jimmy Carter’s election as President in November of 
1976.  It is not too surprising, then, that a CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 
November 1975 was less than definitive in its projection of future Soviet strategic 
capabilities and intentions.  Instead of one set of speculations, it posited five possible 
Soviet force developments based on five possible ways SALT negotiations and 
Soviet/American relations may have gone through the mid -1980s.26  Although 
expressing caution about future Soviet capabilities, the NIE ended by optimistically 
projecting the best of the five scenarios for future SALT developments.   
 In less than a year’s time the complacent, less than definite, tone of these NIEs 
were directly challenged, ironically at the request of CIA director George Bush.  By 
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1975, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) began to question the 
accuracy of the traditional “in house” CIA assessments.  Respected outsiders like arms 
control expert Albert Wohlstetter also voiced concerns that the CIA was underestimating 
the Soviet threat.  By 1975 PFIAB was recommending the creation of an outside group of 
experts as a “Team B” to engage in competitive analysis with the CIA’s analysts who 
would constitute “Team A.”27    
 Chosen to head Team B was historian Richard Pipes, a very conservative, anti-
communist Soviet expert then teaching at Harvard.  Pipes selected the rest of his team, 
and among those he picked was Paul Nitze and Dr. William van Cleave, both of whom 
had at one time been members of the SALT I delegation.  Also chosen were Paul 
Wolfowitz, then working for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Thomas Wolfe 
of RAND, and Foy Kohler, former Ambassador to Moscow.  Team B’s methodology was 
to use the same information given to Team A and to prepare their own independent report 
by first analyzing Team A’s methodology, and then look at specific Soviet strategic 
programs and the CIA’s interpretation of this evidence and offer their own competing 
interpretation.  A more general political-military assessment of the Soviet strategic 
situation was also a part of the process.28    
  The particular criticisms leveled by Team B in their own NIE are 
instructive to consider, based not only on what they say, but how it reflects the general 
critique of the supporters of détente and SALT, (albeit sometimes less articulately) that 
would gain ground throughout the 1970s.  According to the Team B summary, previous 
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NIEs erred in focusing on only the “hard” data collected by technical means, and ignored 
“soft” data about Soviet strategic concepts and military thinking.  This failure resulted in 
NIEs that did not address “the broader political purposes which underlie and explain 
Soviet strategic objectives.”29  Previous NIEs continually interpreted Soviet behavior in 
American terms, and this “mirror-imaging” “ignored the fact that “Soviet thinking is 
Clausewitzian in character, that is, that it conceives in terms of ‘grand strategy’ for which 
military weapons,….represent only one element in a varied arsenal of means of 
persuasion and coercion, many of them non-military in nature.”30   The Soviets were 
offensive rather than defensive minded and pursued a nuclear war-winning capability.   
They did not think in terms of mutual stability or parity, and as such, the Soviets pursued 
détente only as a way to hold the West at bay while they pursued strategic advantage. 
 A final criticism by Team B bears special mention because it also reflects a 
complaint about not only where many increasingly thought arms control was going, but 
the wrong- headed direction of the government in general.  This had to do with what the 
perception of the pernicious influence of political pressure on intelligence interpretation.  
Earlier drafters of NIEs displayed an inclination to downplay the Soviet threat for fear of 
the upsetting implications for détente, SALT, and congressional sentiments.31  In short, 
intelligence, and hence national security, was being hindered and sacrificed for the sake 
of political and bureaucratic sensibilities.  
 The opinions and feelings expressed by Team B would have represented simply 
an interesting historical footnote in the annals of U.S. intelligence gathering had those 
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individuals and their opinions existed in vacuum, or had they been wildly out of step with 
prevailing or growing opinion.32  But neither was the case, nor were the key Team B 
members confined in their activities and opinions only to the then secret CIA project.  In 
fact, several key members of Team B, namely Richard Pipes, Paul Nitze, Foy Kohler, and 
William van Cleave were also, while serving on Team B, also members of the 
conservative, anti-communist, private interest group, the Committee on The Present 
Danger (CPD).   
 The CPD that formed in 1976 was the second version of this advocacy group first 
formed in the winter of 1950-51 in the wake of the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, 
Truman’s promulgation of NSC-68, and the outbreak of the Korean War.  The second 
CPD was a larger group than the original and officially consisted of a little over 150 
prominent people in academia, business, the media (mainly magazines), the arts (mostly 
novelists), retired military officers, attorneys, and a host of former government 
employees and insiders.  They advocated a rejection of détente as an exercise in self 
deception regarding the Soviet threat, a U.S. military modernization and build up, and a 
general return of the hard line with the Soviet Union.  They would consistently offer a 
harsh critique of President Carter’s policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.  As will be seen 
later, these people constantly spoke and wrote, and sometimes protested, to articulate and 
further their ideas through the 1970s and into the 1980s.  In 1979 they would add a new 
member who as early as 1976 had already created a stir, and a hope, within the 
Republican Party and with conservatives in general-- Ronald Reagan.    
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 Set against these political and policy debates, American society was changing and 
transforming in ways that would facilitate the success and influence of groups like the 
CPD.  By the mid -1970s the face of anti-communism was changing.  Increasingly, the 
most vocal anti-communists were Democrats, many of whom were old liberals alienated 
by the leftist radicalism of the 1960s.  In 1972 anti-communist liberals formed their own 
pressure group, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, whose leader was the hawkish 
Democrat, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson from Washington.   
 American Jews, many of whom considered themselves liberal, also increasingly 
took an anti-Soviet position because of the military support that the communist bloc was 
providing to Israel’s adversaries in the Middle East.  The increasing repression of the 
Jews and the violation of their human rights violations in the communist world also 
played a role.  Although many American Jews remained loyal to the Democratic Party, 
they became increasingly disenchanted with President Carter, and they became a 
significant voice in the neo-conservative movement.33  Historian Philip Jenkins has 
recently made a telling observation about Jewish struggles in the 1970s and anti-
communism.  Jenkins discusses the anti-Jewish terrorism that, by the mid 1970s, was 
reaching new heights, as epitomized by the Entebbe crisis of 1976 in which an El Al 
passenger plane was taken hostage by Palestinian radicals and German militants and the 
subsequent successful rescue mission by Israeli commandos.  Jenkins contends that; 
“Terrorism, Third World radicalism, and anti-Semitism merged symbolically.  The 
dazzling Israeli rescue mission proved, triumphantly, that armed force could and should 
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serve as the proper response to such menaces.  It did not take great imagination to extend 
these lessons to the confrontation with Communism.”34    
 Jenkins also examines how Americans in general linked their domestic fears with 
their international ones.  Fear of Soviet power was sincere and in some respects 
reasonable, but was also a foreign extension of fears over issues like rising crime, rapists, 
child molesters, cults, drugs, and gangs.  These were problems that many Americans 
attributed as the legacy of the radical sixties, and as Jenkins puts it, “Popular anger and 
fear were aroused by perceptions of military weakness and international decline, but 
these issues were intimately linked to threats to the most basic realities of life: family 
structures and gender roles, neighborhood and community.”35   It was within this political 
and social environment that Jimmy Carter would attempt to craft his own arms control 
and Soviet policy, and fight the Cold War.                                                              
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CHAPTER 2 
 In recent years, historians have debated the accuracy of the Team B NIEs; but 
however accurate, in hindsight, the reports may have been, the experiment certainly had 
an effect on how intelligence was interpreted from then on, and therefore, how any 
president would have perceived the Soviets based on that information.  Many years later, 
Carter’s CIA Director Admiral Stanfield Turner claimed that after Team B’s report, 
analysts tended to “lean over backwards not to underestimate the Soviet Union.”36  
According to Willard Matthias, the Team B experiment also led to a breakdown in the 
CIA’s ability to produce authoritative Soviet estimates, and the process became 
dominated by politics, the military services, and “anti-Communist ideologists, 
collaborating under the aegis of the Committee on the Present Danger.”37   
 Whatever the accuracy of America’s intelligence gathering may have been at the 
time, it nevertheless seems clear that the Soviet Union was increasing in its confidence 
and ambition.  When the Politburo met to discuss their plans for the Third World, 
Anatoly Dobrynin says that, “American complaints were not even seriously considered.  
The Politburo simply did not see them as a legitimate American concern and not a major 
factor in our relations with Washington.”38  Georgi Arbatov acknowledges that during the 
mid-1970s the Soviet Union embarked on a nuclear buildup “Possibly out of our own 
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deeply rooted inferiority complex,” as well as the joy over seeing the West worry about 
each new weapons system as a manifestation of Soviet strength.  However, Arbatov 
states that “we were arming ourselves like addicts, without any apparent need.”39   
 American fears then were both real and constructed, and the two often 
overlapped, so it is perhaps fitting that a president like Jimmy Carter, who likewise at the 
time often seemed so ambiguous and contradictory, should have assumed office when 
Soviet intentions, and the state of U.S. security, represented such a big question mark.  
Even today, the words “ambiguous”, “contradictory”, “vague”, or “confusing” are often 
used when describing the man and his policies.  For the most part, this is justified.  Carter 
was often contradictory and vague in his public statements, and looked at as a whole, so 
was his Soviet policy.   
 In some respects this incoherence only seems such, and if looked at with an eye 
for subtle continuities of foreign policy intent rather than of style, then what happened 
during the Carter years starts to make more sense.  It also allows one to see more clearly 
how the new infrastructure and language of dissent against detente in American society 
was shaping the nation’s foreign policy.  To do this, we must focus on the aspect of 
President Carter’s Soviet policy that was the most vexing to the Soviets themselves, to 
his critics, to historians, even to some in his own administration, namely his insistence on 
pursuing human rights issues within the détente/SALT context.   
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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RETURN TO CONFRONTATION 
 There were changes taking place in America socially and politically when Jimmy 
Carter took office in 1977.  The emergence of human rights politics was fast becoming a 
popular cause across the political spectrum.  Human rights have, of course, been a part of 
the American national ethos from the beginning; it is woven into the language of the 
nation’s founding documents.  But for most of the nation’s history, America and its 
leaders tended to maintain a policy of non-involvement concerning how other countries 
chose to treat their own people unless it was felt that the issue somehow affected U.S. 
national security or credibility.  Human rights did not become a permanent part of the 
political agenda in America until the late 20th century and, as Kenneth Cmiel has pointed 
out, the mid 1970s in particular.40  
 Key to this new political vogue was the emergence of new sources of funding for 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch and the passage of legislation by Congress before Carter assumed office.  
The new human rights movement was decidedly international in scope and focused on 
state-sponsored repression of the basic civil rights of freedom of expression, fair trials, 
and protection from torture as well as the right to emigrate.  It provided a new way for 
many to view international politics, and, as Cmiel puts it, “It also, especially between 
1973 and 1976, presented a sharp and explicit challenge to the cynical realpolitik of 
Richard M. Nixon’s and Henry A. Kissinger’s détente.”41  Between 1970 and 1976, the 
number of dues paying members in the American branch of Amnesty International rose 
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from 6,000 to 35,000, and in 1977 the organization was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.  
Most importantly, however, the human rights issue attracted an ideologically diverse 
group of patrons with otherwise different, even opposing, political agendas.  Liberal 
Democrats like Senator Don Fraser of Minnesota and Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, along 
with conservative anti-communists like Democrat Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of 
Washington, and Republican Senator John Ashbrook of Ohio made common cause under 
the human rights banner.42    
 This bipartisan, or multi-partisan, nature of the mid-70s human rights movement 
can perhaps be linked to broader and deeper trends in American life that also crossed 
political lines, namely the growing emphasis on morality and its perceived decline in the 
nation.  As Phillip Jenkins points out, for liberals politics was always a “profoundly 
moral endeavor” but that morality was limited to issues of social and racial justice.  
Issues of personal morality were not seen to be within the scope of government.  This 
began to change in the 1960s so that by the early 1970s “many ordinary people actively 
sought public and political intervention to combat social decay.”43   
Likewise, during the 1960s conservatism, as epitomized by Barry Goldwater and 
his political philosophy, could be hawkish on issues of anti-communism and national 
defense, but libertarian on social issues.44  By the mid-1970s, however, a distinct 
evangelical “southernization” of American politics made such social permissiveness 
politically untenable.45  A significant factor contributing to this “southernization” was the 
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social and economic changes occurring in the nation’s “sunbelt” region in the 1970s that 
increased the South’s political power.46  This trend brought with it a growing 
fundamentalist, Baptist-based, reaction to the perceived moral decline of the nation and 
called for Americans to put God at the center of their lives again.47  This brand of 
religious conservatism helped Carter, an openly “born again” Christian, get elected, but it 
also “linked domestic and foreign issues in a way that now seems absolutely 
commonplace but which was then not seen as quite so inevitable.”48  Crucial figures in 
this new religious movement were televangelists like Pat Robertson, who supported 
Carter in 1976, and Jerry Falwell.  Carter quickly fell into disfavor with both men, and 
they became instrumental in organizing and promulgating the opposition of a grass roots 
movement against the President’s policies which included arms control and détente.49         
 Both liberals and conservatives were concerned with the crime rate, which by the 
mid-1970s was in fact so high that by 1976 the Supreme Court approved the 
reintroduction of the death penalty.50  Movie goers cheered in the theaters at graphic 
depictions of bad guys receiving brutal street justice in films like Dirty Harry, Death 
Wish, and Taxi Driver.  There was also a growing consciousness over child abuse and 
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molestation that, while reflecting an obviously reasonable concern, often took on a 
hysterical and sometimes homophobic quality.51  In short, Americans at this time were 
being increasingly swept up into a climate of fear and victimhood, and human rights 
provided a logical extension of these concerns into the international arena that allowed 
for both confrontation with the enemy and a rejection of Cold War containment dogma.   
 In August of 1975, the Helsinki Final Act represented a new and important form 
of international human rights activism.  Ironically, this act, which was considered a 
central symbol of détente, provided a political weapon that Jimmy Carter used to return 
the United States to an era of confrontation with the Soviet Union and with which he 
would wage his brand of Cold War.  The principle element of this agreement was the 
confirmation and acceptance of Eastern European boundaries established in 1945.  The 
agreement was divided into three main parts, or “baskets.”  Basket I provided for 
“Security in Europe” and consisted of ten principles of international relations that 
covered issues like respect of sovereignty, abjuring the threat or use of force, peaceful 
settlement of disputes and respect for human rights.  Basket II covered cooperation in 
economic, scientific, and technological interests, such as the promotion of tourism and 
migrant labor.  Basket III elaborated on the human rights language in basket I and 
covered cultural and educational exchange, freer movement of people, ideas and 
information, and contained provisions for family reunification, bi-national marriages, 
access to published and broadcast information.52   
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 Either Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev did not fully realize the implications the 
Final Act, specifically Baskets I and III, or he considered the gains in the agreement to 
outweigh any future problems.  In any case John Lewis Gaddis has argued that, “Helsinki 
became, in short, a legal and moral trap….Without realizing the implications, he 
[Brezhnev] thereby handed his critics a standard, based on universal principles of justice, 
rooted in international law, independent of Marxist-Leninist ideology, against which they 
could evaluate the behavior of his and other communist regimes.”53  The “they” referred 
to here was not only the United States, but dissident groups and human rights 
organizations all over the world emboldened by the agreement who began evaluating 
communist behavior and found it severely wanting.  “Helsinki Groups” sprouted 
throughout Eastern Europe, even in Moscow, with the endorsement of high profile 
dissidents like Andrei Sakharov.   
 
JIMMY CARTER AND THE RETURN OF IDEOLOGY 
 A renewed focus on ideology was probably the most important factor that linked 
the Presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.  For both men their ideology had a 
distinct moralistic component to it.  Both saw America, and its core principles, as a force 
for freedom, justice, and peace.  The policy decisions that each would draw from this 
belief would, however, be very different, and that difference would lie in what the two 
Presidents saw as the most effective way to wage Cold War.  Carter’s ideology was that 
of human rights, and compared with Reagan’s it was a bit more politically elastic and 
inclusive.  Human rights were appealing to both conservatives and liberals albeit for 
different reasons.  As Robert A. Strong has pointed out, conservatives saw the human 
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rights issue as important because it provided a way to abandon détente and step up 
attacks on the Soviet Union, liberals saw it as a way to limit U.S. support for right-wing 
dictators around the world.  Regardless, the net effect of the policy was a platform, “on 
which George McGovern and Henry Jackson could stand side by side without much 
distance, or discomfort between them.”54   
 This facet of Carter’s foreign policy would represent a continuity of policy 
initiatives begun by his predecessor President Ford.  Carter criticized Ford for not taking 
human rights seriously.  This was exemplified by Ford’s refusing to meet with Soviet 
dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn.  Moreover, it seems that Carter’s human rights values 
came from a deeper place, born of his experience growing up in the South during the civil 
rights movement of the 1960s, and the lessons he drew from the success of non-violent 
resistance that he felt could be applied to a world wide struggle.55   
 In his memoirs, Carter expressed admiration for Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow 
Wilson, listed human rights first among his “most important values” and hoped that the 
expansion of human rights “might be the wave of the future throughout the world, and 
[he] wanted the United States to be on the crest of this movement.”56   Carter also 
believed that the nation had historically been at its strongest and most effective when it 
adhered to its basic values of freedom and democracy and emphasized these values in its 
foreign policy.57  These were especially useful values in a post -Vietnam, post- 
Watergate, bicentennial election year.58  In his inaugural address, Carter asserted that the 
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nation’s commitment to human rights must be “absolute” and “human dignity must be 
enhanced.”59  He also linked national strength abroad to domestic strength and asserted 
that “To be true to ourselves we must be true to others” reflecting, or maybe responding 
to, the connection between the domestic and the foreign noted by Phillip Jenkins.  “Dirty 
Harry” would have agreed with President Carter’s dream of a “just and peaceful world 
that is truly humane”, though Carter’s vision relied not on the use of a big gun, but rather 
the nation’s founding principles, and the new human rights movement that he believed 
was on the rise.   
 Indicative of the type of official criticisms of Soviet non-compliance with the 
Helsinki agreements from the Carter White House was a report delivered to the 
Committee on International Relations in June 1977.  The report spoke of “sharp 
differences between Western and Eastern interpretations of the Final Act,” and accused  
the U.S.S.R. and its allies of using specious legalistic arguments to deemphasize the Final 
Act’s human rights principles.60  The report further summarized the Soviets’ human 
rights violations against dissidents like Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Orlov, Anatoli 
Shcharansky, and Andrey Sakharov.  It also cited an Amnesty International report that at 
least 90 such dissidents had been convicted in the Soviet Union since the singing of the 
Final Act.61   Persecution of Christian religious groups was another major charge, and the 
report quoted Carter asserting that, “no member of the United Nations can claim that 
mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business.”62         
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 However, Carter’s handling of the human rights issue would quickly become a 
target of criticism for the neo-conservatives.  Even relatively centrist neo conservatives 
like Daniel Patrick Moynihan disparaged the President’s approach as too soft on the 
Soviet Union because it focused too much on the human rights abuses of third world 
nations (some friendly to the U.S.), and diverted attention from the “central struggle of 
our time” between democracy and communism.63  This was a view that was shared across 
the spectrum of opposition to détente, including the neo-conservatives, the religious right, 
American Jewry, and the rest of the public.          
 However, its was this inherent tension between the President’s view of how to 
confront the Soviets, and what the opponents of détente and SALT, which increasingly 
would include the American public, saw as the best way to meet rising Soviet power that 
would characterize the return to confrontation during Carter’s Presidency.  Conservatives 
embraced the fight for human rights as a way to put pressure on the Soviet government, 
but they also felt human rights alone would not ensure America’s safety.  Paul Nitze’s 
Foreign Affairs article, published a year before Carter took office, would prove to be only 
the beginning of a sustained and increasing attack on détente and Soviet policies.  Nitze’s 
fellow CPD member Norman Podhoretz provided a regular forum for the emerging neo-
conservative critique of U.S.-Soviet relations in his magazine, Commentary.   
Whereas Nitze’s January 1976 article represented cautious skepticism about the 
possible dangers of détente, Theodore Draper was, in February that same year, 
characterizing detente as appeasement in new packaging.64  Specifically, he contended 
that appeasement had been “built into” détente due to a combination of naïve concessions 
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and “incentives” given to the Soviets, who were “unappeasable” and unquestionably 
expansionist.  Two months later Podhoretz accused liberal American isolationists ( i.e. 
liberals against U.S. aid to anti-Communist forces in Africa and elsewhere)  of “Making 
the World Safe for Communism” and by July 1977 Richard Pipes was explaining “Why 
the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War.”65   Both Draper’s and 
Podhoretz’s articles linked their critiques of détente to a lack of resolve on the human 
rights issues by both the Nixon and Ford administrations, but they also linked it to what 
they saw as a growing imbalance of power in the Soviet’s favor.  Put another way, they 
echoed Carter’s belief that the will to support human rights reflected the nation’s will to 
live up to its core principles, but they did so in a decidedly partisan, anti-communist 
manner that demanded a rejection of détente.  Podhoretz rejected Carter’s idea of 
denouncing all oppressive governments, maintaining that U.S. supported dictatorships at 
least had a fighting chance to acquire democratic freedoms (e.g. Spain and Portugal), as 
opposed to the Communist world, “where there is still not a single instance of any 
Communist regime being overthrown and succeeded by a democratic government…”66   
Richard Pipes’ article focused more specifically on matters of military doctrine, 
specifically the difference in understanding the two nations had about the purpose of 
maintaining a nuclear arsenal and the goals of nuclear warfare between the two nations.  
Pipes concluded that the Soviets did, and always had, believed that nuclear war, while 
certainly a costly and destructive option, was nevertheless winnable.  They did not invest 
the same amount of faith in mutual deterrence as the United States, and American 
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leadership was deluding itself in this regard through a dangerous “combination of 
arrogance and ignorance.”67  He linked this ignorance to an even deeper 
misunderstanding of a Soviet mindset that viewed life with “an extreme Social Darwinist 
outlook” that held that only cunning and coercion ensured survival, and that this attitude 
“permeates the Russian elites as well as the Russian masses.”68  Moreover, SALT 
overlooked the important issue of qualitative improvements within established weapons 
quotas, and the size of Soviet land and sea forces.69 
The apparent growth in the size and quality of the Soviet navy was a particular 
concern for U.S. military analysts throughout the 1970s.  Admiral Stansfield Turner, 
whom President Carter appointed Director of Central Intelligence on March 9, 1977, 
shared these concerns about the Soviet navy in an article in Foreign Affairs published 
shortly after his appointment as CIA director.70  In this article, Turner criticized the 
manner in which U.S. and Soviet navies had been traditionally compared.  In short, he 
contended that too much emphasis had been placed on raw numbers (mainly of ships and 
subs) at the expense of thoughtful consideration of how naval power related to each 
nation’s respective goals, security concerns, and geo-political agenda.  The differences in 
these factors determined different military needs, and hence the differences in 
technological and war fighting capabilities of the two navies.     
Nevertheless, he was still able to come to some general conclusions, specifically, 
that in the area of anti-submarine warfare the balance was tipping against the United 
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States, and that an increase in Soviet missile firing naval aircraft could tip the balance in 
their favor in the future.  More importantly, Admiral Turner made an even more 
insightful and astute observation about how cleverly the Soviet Union was playing the 
arms game when he wrote, “Realizing that they [the Soviets] are dealing with 
perceptions, they are gaining maximum advantage from the fact that any change is 
news,” and this change “creates the impression of improvement as the Soviet move from 
little to more.”71  Moreover, Turner argued that as the U.S. Navy drew down from 
traditional deployments, the Soviets had simultaneously increased its global deployments 
and, in a statement that echoes President Lincoln’s quote when he observed that, “It 
seems a confirmation of the claim that we are a declining sea power and that they are a 
growing and restive one.  The invalidity of that claim is academic if it is universally 
believed.”72   
The overall relevance of Turner’s article is that it reflects what seems to have 
been a fundamental way of thinking about arms control in the Carter Administration.  
Namely, that comparative military strength could not be reduced simply to numbers.  
Arms control is a complex issue, filled with ambiguity reflected in the equally ambiguous 
ways that Carter would speak and act on the issue and in how he would react to the 
sometimes ambiguous Soviet actions and pronouncements.  The article also conveyed an 
overall attitude of conservative moderation on national defense requirements, and 
simultaneously a prudent caution over the nature of the Soviet threat.  Turner closed his 
article with an implicit warning, that while the Soviet Union was a latecomer as a sea 
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power, it “exhibits many of the traits of nineteenth century imperialism exercised with all 
the resources of supertechnology…”73   
Turner was a midshipman with Carter at Annapolis, and at his swearing in as DCI 
the President expressed his deep admiration for the Admiral and confidence in Turner’s 
ability to provide “superb leadership” for the task of intelligence gathering and 
coordination.74  Even though Turner may not have been the most consistently influential 
person in the Carter administration, it seems reasonable to assume that Turner 
communicated his ideas to the President and that those ideas made an impression.  The 
article clearly made an impression on the U.S. Senate in 1977, specifically on their 
Committee on the Budget.  The entire text was included in a Senate study entitled “The 
Military Balance between NATO and The Warsaw Pact.”75  The study was a part of a 
larger Senate hearing on the defense budget for fiscal year 1978, and Turner’s article was 
only one of several by defense experts who gave cautiously optimistic appraisals of the 
U.S.-Soviet strategic balance.   
Put simply, by the time Carter took office, even nonpartisan expert opinion on 
America’s strategic vulnerability seemed to skirt the line between prudence and paranoia.  
In the summer 1976 John D. Steinbruner and Thomas Garwin of Harvard University’s 
John F. Kennedy School of Government attempted to discern exactly where that line 
could be drawn in an article in International Security.76  The article is highly technical, 
but their salient points were that many technical realities of nuclear weapons, including 
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the effects of an all out nuclear exchange were a mystery for the simple reason it had 
never occurred.  Likewise, the performance of nuclear weapons, specifically regarding 
warhead accuracy and reliability, under actual combat conditions is also rife with 
unknowns.  The authors made modest predictions about Soviet technological 
improvement and the threat it would pose.  However, their general conclusions were still 
ambiguous because “The full consequences of nuclear war cannot be calculated with 
much assurance, and, as far as objective validity is concerned, even the most exacting 
analysis is destined to be overwhelmed by uncertainty.”77  However, they concluded that 
the implication of weighing these uncertainties against known generalities about nuclear 
weapons technology meant that, “it would be more pathological than prudent to 
undertake major changes in the deployed strategic forces of the United States in order to 
solve the problem of vulnerability…”78  They also argued that the gains from major 
upgrades in weaponry would be gains mainly in the form of the “elusive” area of political 
perception, and would be out weighed by the enormous monetary cost and the burden put 
on existing command and control systems, thereby degrading the effectiveness of 
America’s military capability.79 
Here again was a call, not for military force reductions, but for caution and 
modest change.  It is unknown whether President Carter ever actually read Steinburner’s 
and Garwin’s article, but it is certainly the type of literature he did read.  Overall, 
therefore, informed opinion on national defense ranged from the alarmist, virulently anti-
communist to the cautious voice of reason and moderation.  But even in the most 
sanguine estimates of the strategic balance, there were hints of danger.  Senate hearings, 
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while largely neutral in tone, nevertheless included a statement by Senator Sam Nunn, of 
Georgia, speaking before the New York Militia Association, in which he used the 
historically potent term “blitzkrieg” to characterize Soviet war fighting doctrine in 
Western Europe.80   
In sum, by 1978 there was a developing view in the United States of the U.S.-
Soviet strategic relationship that was masked in ambiguity, but which identified a 
dangerous Soviet threat.  Critics of détente and SALT like Nitze, Pipes, and Podhoretz 
insisted that this threat be made more explicit to the American people, and they set about 
doing just that.  The public and the mainstream media began to agree with them in 
increasing number as the 1970s wore on.  Philip Jenkins sums up the trajectory of public 
sentiment well by observing that domestic worries coincided with international ones and, 
“these issues encouraged a sense of imminent apocalypse, a term that can be used with 
little exaggeration to describe the national mood of 1980.”81    
Jimmy Carter’s Soviet policy can be seen as consisting of two distinct 
characteristics: a clear ideological crusade to pressure the Soviet Union into improving its 
human rights record, and a national defense policy that called for pursuing strategic arms 
limits while maintaining a credible strategic deterrent that was not destabilizing.  Human 
rights was Carter’s method of waging Cold War in the most politically advantageous way 
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possible, something that every U.S. President since 1945 had to do in the most politically 
feasible way open to them.  What remains is to explain just how confrontational this 
human rights agenda was by looking at the Soviet reaction to it, and how the combination 
of this reaction, the nature of the Brezhnev government, and the growing infrastructure of 
dissent against détente at home, shaped Carter’s decisions and linked him to the hard line 
for which his successor would become known.    
 
 
          
CHAPTER 3 
Only six days after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter told ABC 
news anchor Frank Reynolds, “My opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically 
the last week than even the previously two years before that.”  There was a distinct tone 
of disbelief in his remarks as he paused, and occasionally stammered slightly that 
suggested an implicit inclusion of himself when he said that it was “only now dawning 
upon the world the …magnitude of the action the Soviets undertook.” 82  Carter had 
awakened to a new rude reality in which he felt his Soviet partner in détente had deceived 
him.  In hindsight, his surprise seems startling when one considers, as Adam Ulam puts 
it, “This was the President of the United States, with his special sources of intelligence, 
innumerable expert advisers, and his own prior first-hand experience in dealing with 
Brezhnev and his colleagues!”83  Indeed, Ulam’s observation suggests that in the Carter 
administration there existed a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet 
government under Brezhnev.   
Considering it now, in its historical entirety, it seems clear that the Soviets played 
an unintentional role in the infrastructure of dissent against détente.  They held a 
fundamentally different conception of what détente was supposed to be and what it was 
supposed to achieve, and they approached the arms control aspect of the process half- 
heartedly at best.  Politically, and therefore culturally, the Soviet Union was following a 
different political path than the United States.  The basic Soviet conception of détente 
was, broadly speaking, twofold; it was a process of obtaining American acceptance of 
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Soviet strategic and political equality, and a method of gaining economic and 
technological benefits while biding time until the eventual collapse of capitalism.  
Therefore, Soviet détente, and its stress on peaceful coexistence, did not preclude the 
continuation of socialist struggle against an aggressive imperialist West.84  Advantage 
rather than peace then was the ultimate goal of Soviet détente and their policy, as 
Raymond Garthoff explains, always contained “a strong competitive element” and was 
“guided by calculations of relative cost, risk, and gain in any initiative or response.”85  
Recently released and translated Warsaw Pact documents indicate that by the mid-1970s 
the initial Soviet confidence in its own strategic parity with the West, and NATO’s 
comparative weakness, had given way to a perception of insecurity and a perceived 
imbalance of power in NATO’s favor.86  Suspicion, growing NATO defense budgets, and 
the increasing influence of the military and other hard liners would lead Brezhnev, in 
November 1978, to assert that, “one could anticipate a massive attack against détente, 
against the policies of the socialist states.”87             
However, anti-western suspicion and belligerency was an established facet of 
Soviet culture long before the détente’s death in the late 70s.  Émigré Cathy Young 
recalls as a third grader, in 1973, being taught confrontational poems with titles like 
“Them and Us” that spoke of the dollars that “they” would use to “furnish murderers with 
deadly tools;” and included caricatured illustrations of evil looking, hawk nosed 
capitalists with a bag of money in one hand and a missile in the other, juxtaposed with a 
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big blond, muscular worker in overalls .88  Likewise, Hedrick Smith reported on the 
militarized nature of Soviet schools, and how in 1973 textbooks for ninth and tenth 
graders assured students that “the U.S. has not turned away from its aggressive course” 
and explained how the requirements for military readiness had grown because of the 
dangers posed by “imperialist circles.”89  More recently, Robert Conquest asserted that 
throughout the entire détente period the Soviet government maintained a continuous flow 
of propaganda at home and abroad to undermine Western governments.90  These are 
simply cultural reflections of the two most important characteristics of Leonid 
Brezhnev’s government : one that it was conservative, stuck in ideological tradition, and 
resistant to radical change ; and two, that by the mid-1970s, the military increasingly 
influenced and shaped policy to a degree perhaps never seen before in Soviet history.  
In this respect the Soviet government of the 1970s stood as a mirror of its leader, 
or perhaps he mirrored it.  Whatever the case, as Dmitri Volkogonov writes, Leonid 
Brezhnev “was a man of one dimension, with the psychology of a middle ranking Party 
functionary, vain, wary, and conventional.  He was afraid of sharp turns, terrified of 
reform, but was capable of twisting the Party line in whatever direction the hierarchy 
desired.”91   From 1973 onward he suffered several strokes.  By the mid seventies his 
authority rested squarely on a system of cronyism.  His Politburo was composed mostly 
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of promotees from the Stalin era whose average age by 1980 was sixty nine and whose 
“fundamental attitudes to politics and economics had been formed before 1953.”92   
          Much the same was true of Brezhnev’s close associates who included future 
General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko (Central Committee secretary in 1977) and 
Nikolai Tikhonov who served as First Deputy Chairman.  Some of these associates and 
acquaintances included military officers who had fallen into disfavor under Khrushchev 
but to whom Brezhnev had remained friendly.  The most notable of these were Marshall 
Andrei Grechko and Admiral Sergey Gorshkov.  Brezhnev repaid their friendship after 
taking power with important and influential appointments in the government.93          
Of these two military figures, it is Marshal Grechko with his election to Minister 
of Defense and his promotion to the Politburo as a voting member in May 1973.  Many 
historians and Soviet experts consider the most significant, mainly because it was seen as 
indicative of the growing power and influence of the military in Soviet politics and policy 
making, especially by the late years of the Brezhnev era.94  As early as 1973, Soviet 
experts recognized that an important change had occurred in the relationship between 
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military and civilian leadership in the government.  Marshall Grechko’s new position 
suggested “a new departure in army-party relations and in the system of checks and 
balances hitherto maintained by the Soviet political leadership.”  Moreover, this new 
development was seen as so far representing, “the military leaders’ nearest point of 
access to the party chief on a constitutional basis.”95  By 1977 Soviet military expert 
Edward L. Warner could confidently state that, “throughout the Brezhnev period the 
Soviet military has most certainly been well treated by the political leadership.” and “the 
Ministry of Defense has most likely become accustomed to having a significant voice in 
defense-related matters…”96     
Although Brezhnev’s inner circle was not composed entirely of military people 
most, like KGB chief Yuri Andropov, were conservative ideologues whose attitudes 
toward foreign policy, including détente, were characterized by suspicion, caution, and 
duplicity.  The more the Soviet leader’s health deteriorated, the more this group of 
flatterers and self serving bureaucrats began to shape foreign policy from behind the 
scenes.97    
These basic characteristics translated into a Soviet conception of détente and arms 
control fundamentally different from the Carter administration’s goals.  The effect of this, 
in turn, was that although the two nations pursued the same goal in name, they 
nevertheless followed different paths.  Like two travelers who agree that their destination 
is “Paris” but fail to realize that one means France and the other Texas, the two 
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superpowers found themselves moving radically away from each other by the late 1970s, 
with the basic spirit of détente becoming attenuated to the breaking point.   
In 1975 Raymond Garthoff observed a virtual absence of references to SALT in 
Soviet military literature, yet he noted that the military’s participation in SALT planning 
“has been active and vigorous at all levels.”  Furthermore, he surmised that the effect of 
this was a conservative and cautious influence on Soviet positions born of a concern for 
undercutting the case for a strong military posture.98  Harry Gelman sees 1975 as the 
“decisive crossover” point in Politburo attitudes away from “the expectations of 
grandiose benefits from bilateral relationship toward a more forthright flaunting of the 
pursuit of competitive advantage.”  He cites the effort to support a Communist take over 
in Portugal, growing involvement in Africa, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as 
the three events which had the greatest effect of the evolution of Soviet behavior.99  Also 
influential was the American humiliation after the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, a 
humiliation that made possible largely through the increased Soviet military aid that 
allowed North Vietnam to ignore the terms of the 1973 peace agreements.100   
This emphasis on advantage and American humiliation after 1975 was simply an 
expression of a policy continuity based on the concept of the “correlation of forces.”  
This idea entails both military and nonmilitary concerns, but in the context of détente, it 
specifically meant an advantageous strategic position in relation to the United States, 
both in geopolitical terms and relative raw military strength.  Soviet leadership under 
Brezhnev held a world view that centered on an expectation of lasting struggle with the 
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West.”101  Peace was not the ultimate Soviet aim of détente, the very concept for them 
meant a world safe for “national liberation movements” and the socialist world in 
general.  It was a means of biding time, by obstructing Western military development and 
influence, to allow for an ultimate ideological victory under the guise of peaceful 
coexistence.102     
This translated in the SALT negotiation to a half-hearted attempt at arms control.  
The Soviet government exploited the vague, open ended language of SALT I in the 
Vladivostok Accords of 1974 to pursue a modernization and expansion of their strategic 
nuclear capability.103  In the mid-1970s, new generations of nuclear-capable tactical 
aircraft and more accurate, and multiple warheads (MIRVed), ICBMs began to appear in 
the Soviet arsenal.104  This was mainly possible because of the provisions, or lack of 
provisions, of the Vladivostok Accord.  This agreement had resulted from a summit 
meeting arranged by Kissinger between President Ford and Brezhnev ostensibly as a 
“getting to know you” session.  It produced an accord which served as a stop gap 
agreement until SALT II negotiations could begin in earnest.  The agreement set overall 
levels of strategic nuclear weapons launchers (meaning ground based silos, bombers, and 
submarines that could launch nuclear weapons) at 2,400 for each side.105  The agreement 
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did not, however, propose any constraints on qualitative improvements in weapons 
systems, allowing both sides to upgrade existing weapons in terms of accuracy, 
reliability, offensive capability, and overall performance.     
Within the terms of the agreement, both sides had a “freedom to mix,” meaning 
they could have more bombers than ICBMs, or more submarines than the other two.  As 
one expert observed years later, the Vladivostok agreement did not accomplish that 
much.  It allowed the U.S. an additional 258 launchers above SALT I limits and only 
reduced Soviet launchers by only 99.106  It also left undefined the issue of the cruise 
missile, a new type of weapon perfected in the mid-1970s by the United States and “the 
object of the latest Soviet phobia.”107   
Regardless of these problems, Brezhnev and the rest of the Soviet leadership 
remained satisfied by the provisions of the Vladivostok Accord and subsequently used 
this agreement as the measuring stick against which any subsequent proposals would be 
judged.  For them, Vladivostok essentially was SALT II, and in their conservatism they 
saw no reason to deviate far from it.108     
This combination of civilian conservatism and the influence of the military 
produced Soviet policy decisions that sought to retain the competitive advantages gained 
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in the early 1970s, and to exploit this advantage to further political expansion and 
influence around the world.  Soviet policy was, therefore, a strange combination of 
caution and suspicion toward the U.S. and NATO and ambition and adventurism in the 
third world.  The net result of these two characteristics was a Soviet government that, by 
the late 1970s, took a particularly defensive stance out of fear of losing strategic and 
political gains, and of being obstructed from obtaining further competitive advantage.  
President Carter’s noble, but ill-conceived, focus on human rights and linkage of Soviet 
behavior in general exacerbated the already defensive and suspicious posture of Soviet 
policy on arms control and relations with the United States.     
Jimmy Carter found out just how stubborn and conservative the Soviets could be 
early in his presidency when his administration proposed a revised arms control 
agreement in March 1977.  The President and his senior foreign policy team, which 
included Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and National Security Adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, proposed more dramatic cuts in nuclear arms than were provided by the 
Vladivostok agreement.  This new proposal sought to reduce the Vladivostok limit of 
2,400 strategic launchers to between 1,800 and 2,000 such systems.  It required the 
Soviets to dismantle half of their 300 very large ICBMs, and both sides would forgo the 
deployment of any new ICBMs.  It also proposed to limit the range of the cruise missile 
to 2,500 km, and if deployed on an aircraft, the plane and the missiles together would 
count as a MIRVed strategic weapon.  The Backfire bomber was removed from the 
debate entirely as long as the Soviets promised to not develop it as a long range weapon.  
In return, the U.S. would cancel the development of the B-1 bomber and the Trident 
submarine.   
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Robert Strong surmised that the proposal was attractive to Harold Brown because 
it solved the problems of American missile vulnerability that so concerned Paul Nitze and 
some defense analysts in the Pentagon.  As Strong reasons, the acceptance of this “deep 
cuts” proposal by the Soviets would have made the dire interpretations of Soviet strategic 
build up, presumably by groups like the Committee on the Present Danger, less plausible. 
109  Olav Njolstad echoes this conclusion, stating that Carter was particularly attracted to 
Nitze’s arguments that deep cuts would be the best way to enhance strategic stability and 
solve the problem of “the window of vulnerability” threatening the nation’s Minuteman 
missile force that so concerned Nitze and Senator Henry Jackson.110    
The proposal failed because the Soviets flatly rejected it and saw it as an attempt 
to scrap the Vladivostok accord in favor of an agreement that would unfairly benefit the 
United States.  Georgi Arbatov felt that the deep cuts proposal, “confirmed the 
impression in Moscow that Carter was not serious.”111  Anatoly Dobrynin also saw a lack 
of American seriousness in the proposal and felt that it was, “an attempt to harass us, to 
embarrass us.”112  Because of his pride over Vladivostok Brezhnev in particular took the 
deep cuts proposal as a personal affront, and the Soviet negotiators felt that the 
Americans did not appreciate the effort he had to exert within the Politburo to get the 
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accords approved.113  In sum, the deep cuts proposal was too drastic for the Brezhnev 
government and hence viewed with suspicion and anger.   
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson had been a major influence in the formulation of 
the March “deep cuts” proposal.  In February 1977, a twenty-three page memo crafted by 
the senator and his aide Richard Perle explained their criticisms of  Nixon’s and Ford’s  
arms control policies.  It was submitted to Carter while his administration was working 
on what would become the March proposal.114  Carter took the recommendations of this 
memo very seriously, including what the president would call “Scoop’s ambitious 
demands.” 115  Carter was anxious to make progress on arms control, but also wanted to 
win the support of conservatives like Henry Jackson.  When the draft of the March 
proposal was completed, both Jackson and Perle were pleased, feeling that it was 
“eminently reasonable and sensible.”116  This may seem like a strange position for 
someone as hawkish as Senator Jackson until one considers, as Dan Caldwell has 
suggested, that the memo and proposal constituted a political “honey trap” set to trip up 
Carter in his arms control negotiations with the Soviets.117  Whether meant as a trap or 
not, it did, as Caldwell observes, illustrate “Carter’s desire to achieve an arms control 
agreement that was acceptable to conservatives such as Senator Jackson.”118            
President Carter was neither a naïve nor foolish man when it came to the 
intricacies and subtleties of international diplomacy and arms control.  He was certainly 
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not ignorant of the technical details and important strategic considerations regarding 
national defense and nuclear deterrent.  However, he did come to the White House with a 
bold and lofty vision of a world with far fewer nuclear weapons than then existed, with 
the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether.  Carter placed a great deal of 
stock in the efficacy of direct conversations and the power of personal “heart to heart” 
talks in resolving international disputes.  The best evidence of this is found in Carter’s 
own words, in his memoir, Keeping Faith.  Carter points out that all of his letters to 
Brezhnev were “quite personal in nature--I even wrote some of them in long hand.”119  
He felt that a summit meeting between himself and Brezhnev, “would take care of any 
problems of great importance after our subordinates had hammered out acceptable 
compromises ahead of time.”120  In his description of the Vienna summit meeting that led 
to the signing of SALT II in 1979, Carter places a great amount of importance on the 
private chats that allowed him and Brezhnev to talk as “real people.”  He was genuinely 
touched when the Soviet leader said, with his hand on Carter’s shoulder, “If we do not 
succeed, God will not forgive us.”  Carter seemed sincerely convinced that these personal 
moments “bridged the gap between us more effectively than any official talk.”121  
The salient point here is that President Carter made the mistake of believing that 
in his talks with Leonid Brezhnev, he was effectively dealing with the legitimate source 
of Soviet political power, and that was clearly not the case.  Carter and his administration 
faced a conservative, militaristic, ideologically stagnant oligarchy whose view of what 
détente meant fundamentally differed from the United States’.  This failure to understand 
the essential nature of the Soviet government in the 1970s accounts for President Carter’s 
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rude awakening in December of 1979, and his “drastically” changed opinion of the 
Russians in those days after the invasion of Afghanistan.  Therefore, by 1978, the Soviet 
government became an unintentional part of the body of dissent against détente, along 
with special interest groups like the Committee on the Present Danger, human rights 
organizations, the growing neo-conservative movement, conservative Democrats, and the 
religious right.   
America’s new brand of religious conservatism was another phenomenon that 
Carter misunderstood.  The religious right misunderstood him as well, and the support 
they provided in the 1976 campaign quickly gave way to disillusion and disappointment.  
As William Martin points out, during the first two years of his presidency, “Jimmy Carter 
saw much of his evangelical and other conservative support slip away because people felt 
he had not lived up to the promise of his campaign.”122  Particularly indicative of this loss 
of support were the negative feelings by prominent conservative ministers like Jerry 
Falwell, Oral Roberts, Rex Humbard, Tim LaHaye, Jim Bakker and Charles Stanley 
toward Carter after a January 1980 White House breakfast with the President.  During 
this breakfast, Carter gave what the ministers believed were non-committal or “off the 
wall” answers to questions concerning subjects like abortion and the ERA.   The final 
verdict according to LaHaye was “We had a man in the White House who professed to be 
a Christian, but didn’t understand how un-Christian his administration was.” 123 
Disenchantment with Carter coincided with the religious right’s desire to expand 
its base and support.  Jerry Falwell in particular was one of these ambitious evangelicals 
and, with the help of theologian Francis Schaeffer, he discovered the concept of 
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“cobelligerency.” This meant the process of finding an issue over which people who may 
differ theologically, or on other issues, will nevertheless fight on the same side over 
certain causes or goals.124  One of those issues was anti-Communism and the concomitant 
resistance to détente and arms control.  Falwell’s Moral Majority and organizations like 
The Christian Voice went on record as opposing SALT II and favoring increased defense 
spending.  Falwell lamented the fact that in a nuclear exchange, more Americans than 
Russians would die because of the Soviet’s antiballistic missiles and civil defense, and he 
attacked politicians on religious grounds if they voted against the B-1 bomber.  A Falwell 
associate explained the rationale for this involvement in such non-religious matters. “It 
was a very real threat, and Falwell had an easy time rallying people for a strong 
America.”125    
     By 1978, the combined demands of the upcoming congressional election, 
Soviet intransigence over arms control, and the criticisms of special interest groups began 
to move Carter in a more hard line direction that favored a steady increase in military 
spending.  Biographers and historians, as well as journalists at the time, writing of the 
President and his administration often comment on how Carter seemed to vacillate 
between the opinion of his two most important foreign policy advisers, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance.  Brzezinski, as national security advisor, had a reputation 
for being bold, outspoken, and blunt in his negotiating style.  As a Pole, he had no great 
affection for the Soviet Union and he favored a tougher line in Soviet policy than Vance.  
Strobe Talbott described Brzezinski’s impatience with the slow pace of SALT 
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negotiations, his deep mistrust of the Soviets, and his idea of SALT being a “truth test” of 
Soviet intentions.126  
The changes in Carter’s attitude are evidenced in two important speeches he made 
in 1978, one at Wake Forrest University in March, and the other at Annapolis in June.  
Raymond Garthoff identifies both speeches as indicative of “A Turn Toward 
Confrontation” exacerbated by Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa.127  Carter did 
not miss an opportunity to appeal to the audience’s patriotic values.  Early in the speech, 
he invoked the memory of North Carolina militiamen taking arms against the British in 
the Revolution.  From there he began discussing the tradition of military service in his 
own family, and the peaceful purposes of America’s military and how this had remained 
unchanged, but that the “world” was changing.  
 In fact, change was a major theme of this speech, namely changes in the nation’s 
defense requirements and the change (increase) in the security threats America faced.  He 
emphasized his duties as commander in chief “for modernizing, expanding, and 
improving our armed forces when our security requires it. [italics added]”128  Toward this 
end, Carter mentioned the nation’s submarine fleet, the new Trident submarines under 
construction, and the development of the cruise missile and new MX ICBM.129  He also 
used the speech, and his own sense of domestic feeling, to issue a warning to the Soviets 
that if “they fail to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels or in 
the projection of Soviet proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support 
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in the United States for such cooperation [scientific and economic] with the Soviets will 
certainly erode.”130   
Carter’s expression of confidence in the credibility of the nation’s military 
strategic nuclear deterrent was not entirely empty rhetoric.  It also reflected the realties of 
how certain American weapons systems, specifically the submarine launched Trident 
ballistic missile and the air launched cruise missile (ALCM), were evolving into truly 
effective weapons systems, and what informed opinion felt the implications of these 
weapons were to national security and arms control controversies.  Until the mid-1970s, 
because of its relative inaccuracy compared to ICBMs and aircraft delivered weapons, the 
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was considered a “counter value” weapon, 
meaning that it was assigned to destroy “soft” targets such as urban population areas and 
civilian industrial centers.  As such, SLBM warheads had lower yield warheads than 
ICBMs and were considered second strike weapons for follow on “mopping up” 
attacks.131  By the mid-1970s, however, various technological improvements had 
enhanced the weapons capability for “hard” targets, counterforce use against military 
targets (i.e. enemy ICBM silos) and command and control facilities.132  By 1977, 
discussions of this new SLBM capability circulated through the open literature written by 
defense intellectuals.133    
Years later in his memoirs Carter expounded more upon the factors weighing in 
his decision to cancel the B-1 bomber in his memoirs.  He mentions a “very thorough 
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study of the issue during the spring of 1977” with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.134  He explains that at the time he felt it necessary to prevail 
against not only the supporters of the B-1, but also within the Oval Office, Congress, and 
the American public.  He expressed a great deal of gratitude for Secretary Brown’s 
competence and knowledge in this matter and his ability to “address such a difficult 
question in an objective manner.”135  Certainly Brown was an apt consultant on such 
matters by virtue of being a scientist by training, the president of the California Institute 
of Technology, and Secretary of the Air Force under the Johnson administration.  As 
Strobe Talbott explained, Brown was “a civilian who knew how to deal with-- and give 
orders to—the military, and he possessed two qualities that other administration officials 
lacked, government experience, and “intellectual boldness.”136    
With such a background, Brown certainly would have made a point of remaining 
knowledgeable of the intellectual arguments concerning this emerging and possibly 
revolutionary new type of weapon.  Two defense intellectuals who dominated the B-1 vs. 
cruise missile debate in the mid-1970s were Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood.  
They wrote books, an important article, and corresponded with critics and colleagues  
expressing, albeit in a much more technical and detailed manner, the same basic analysis, 
and opinions that Carter used to defend his B-1 decision.137  There were valid 
disagreements with Quanbeck and Wood, one of the most notable came from Committee 
on the Present Danger member Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who wrote a well reasoned 
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rebuttal to their anti B-1 argument.  However, the arguments presented by Quanbeck’s 
and Wood’s argument were obviously more convincing to many, including Harold 
Brown and President Carter.  Wood’s International Security article in particular 
articulated the arguments related to the greater efficacy of the SLBM force and the 
improved B-52 effectiveness provided by the cruise missile and aircraft upgrades.  Like 
John Steinbruner and Thomas Garwin, they also advocated the prudent but relatively 
modest strategic upgrades that Carter would support.138   
These were the kind of articulate, convincing ideas that were in currency at the 
time that filtered into the public debate on the issue.  The point here is that even relatively 
objective and politically non-partisan ideas of defense intellectuals had on the Carter 
administration just as they had on the previous and subsequent administrations.  Although 
Carter’s decision favoring the cruise missile over the B-1 bomber was a relatively modest 
increase in strategic nuclear capability, it was nevertheless an increase.  President Carter 
could have chosen to turn down both the B-1 and the cruise missile, but he knew that the 
anti-SALT, anti-détente forces were such that he had to initiate some type of 
improvement in the nation’s defenses.  Also, it was his advocacy specifically of the air 
launched cruise missile, which he knew was a major strategic worry for the Soviets, and 
that many arms control commentators considered destabilizing, occurred while he was 
still touting the value of arms control and peaceful coexistence.  This is only one example 
of how Carter’s declaratory and operational policy would diverge as he tried to respond 
to the foreign and domestic anti-détente forces and simultaneously adhere to his original 
idealistic vision.            
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In his next major speech on June 7, 1978, at the U.S. Naval Academy at 
Annapolis, Carter took an even stronger tone.  This time the President wasted little time 
in focusing on his singular subject of Soviet-American relations.  He expressed continued 
belief in détente and the SALT process and even claimed that, “the prospects for a SALT 
II agreement are good.”139  Nevertheless, this speech was the bluntest bit of finger 
wagging at the Soviets that he had ever committed.  Even the positive and optimistic 
sections of the speech were filled with qualifying language that conveyed the idea that 
much of the onus fell on the Soviet leadership for the development of improved relations.  
In some respects, the speech was almost schizophrenic; one moment he promised that he 
had no desire to link SALT negotiations with other “competitive  relationships” and in 
the next breath warned of the complicating factor of American public opinion, declaring 
that “The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation.  The United 
States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.”140    
Likewise, while insisting on détente’s centrality to world peace, he also explained 
the stark differences of understanding in the concept that existed between the two nations.  
For the Soviet Union it meant, “A continuing aggressive struggle for political influence in 
a variety of ways,” along with, “military power and military assistance as the best means 
of expanding their influence abroad.”141   This begged the obvious question: If the two 
nation’s views are so different, then how is détente really possible?  Carter offered no 
explanations that connect these competing ideas in a way that explains how his hopes, 
and the actual reality, could be reconciled and his ideas seem to be strung together as if 
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born of two different minds.  In fact, journalists quickly noticed this fact as well, and 
surmised that the explanation must have been that Carter awkwardly combined the 
positions of Vance and Brzezinski in the speech, and that this accounted for the 
combination of the soft and hard line respectively.  In fact a year after the speech a 
former Carter speech writer claimed that the President had literally stapled together two 
memos, one from Vance and the other from Brzezinski, to construct the speech.  More 
recently, historian Robert Strong has disputed this idea based on information from the 
Carter presidential library.142   
The overall tone of the speech was accusatory, especially in the area of human 
rights.  This speech represented his most direct attack on the Soviets’ human rights record 
to date, something that conservative forces both inside and outside of government had 
long pressured him to do.  Carter spoke of the abuse of human rights in the Soviet Union 
in direct violation of the Helsinki Accords, and the Soviet system’s intolerance of free 
expression and the free movement of people.  As Raymond Garthoff has observed, the 
speech marked a distinct return to ideology as Carter emphasized that America’s 
principal goal was to help shape a world more responsive to economic freedom, social 
justice, and “political self determination” (read democracy).143  In his memoirs, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski admitted that the focus on human rights  attempted to “match Soviet 
ideological expansion by a more affirmative American posture on global human 
rights.”144  This was a change from the cynical realpolitik of the Nixon/Kissinger years, 
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but it also, , constituted a revolt against the “moral anesthesia” of détente itself, whether 
Carter intended to or not.  As John Lewis Gaddis put it, détente, “had not been intended, 
in any immediate sense, to secure justice: that could only emerge….from within a 
balance of power that each of the great powers considered legitimate.”145  This return to 
ideology and challenge to the fundamental nature of détente, namely its amoral 
maintenance of the status quo, is an important link between Jimmy Carter and Ronald 
Reagan in the spectrum of change in Soviet-American relations during the two 
administrations.                          
Jimmy Carter was the first U.S. president to use the issue of human rights to wage 
Cold War in such an explicit manner that attempted link the issue to other foreign policy 
matters.  For a leader who dreamed of arms control, even substantial arms reductions, as 
one of his prime legacies, human rights was an ideological strategy of exerting political 
pressure that did not involve militaristic brinksmanship.  It was an attempt to take an 
attractive political stand that appealed to American’s patriotic values, and a growing 
international movement, that did not risk damaging détente and SALT.   
Carter’s human rights focus was a least a large enough caliber issue that it proved 
enough of an aggravation and annoyance to the Soviets to undermine “peaceful 
coexistence.”  Human rights alone did not undermine détente, but it certainly strained a 
relationship that by late 1978 was already turning sour.  To the Soviet leadership, the 
Annapolis speech represented a clear turn towards confrontation.  The one basic 
understanding of detente shared by both nations was that it was supposed to be a mix of 
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cooperation and competition, and Carter seemed to be making it and either/or choice.146 
They had long since viewed America’s protests over human rights resentfully as an 
attempt to interfere with their nation’s internal affairs.  As such, this represented a 
challenge to the legitimacy of their entire political system and an attempt to undermine 
the legitimacy of socialism itself.147   
The human rights rhetoric was given some teeth later that year when on July, 18 
the U.S. government denied an export license for a Sperry Univac computer to the Soviet 
Union.  The denial was in response to internal repression of political dissidents; new 
licensing requirements were imposed for the export of oil and gas exploration 
equipment.148  Technology transfers were an especially important part of détente for the 
Soviets, and one of the most important technologies was in the area of computers.  Soviet 
computer science had always lagged significantly behind the West and behind the United 
States in particular.  This had obvious implications for the Soviet’s military standing vis-
à-vis the United States given the increasing sophistication of both nuclear and 
conventional weaponry.  Any technology denial was seen simultaneously as a blow to 
their military development and an advantage for the U.S., since as one historian and 
defense expert has pointed out, “To an extent unappreciated in the United States of the 
1970s, the Soviets believed that their American rivals were scientific magicians; what 
they said they could do, they could do.”149    
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American conservatives strongly supported the Carter human rights initiatives, 
but likewise, this wound up becoming a political trap for the President.  Prominent neo-
conservatives like Daniel Patrick Moynihan criticized Carter for not taking a strong 
enough stand on human rights.  To Moynihan, the president was not using the human 
rights issue properly.  He felt that Carter put too much focus on Third World dictatorships 
and gave the real enemy, the Soviet Union, a pass.  In August of 1977, he contended that 
such policies “will soothe the Soviet Union and only challenge Ecuador.”150  The 
Democratic senator’s comments were indicative of the sentiment of the “Henry Jackson” 
wing of the Democratic Party.   
Senator Jackson himself criticized the lack of proper focus in Carter’s human 
rights campaign, and he saw these misplaced priorities as a pretext for Carter’s 
abandoning the policy of containment, and for lessening U.S. commitment abroad.  
Jackson’s aide, Richard Perle, observed that the senator’s ideas about human rights were 
close to those of Jeane Kirkpatrick in their emphasis on distinguishing between right 
wing authoritarian dictatorships friendly to the U.S. and left wing totalitarian regimes like 
the Soviet Union.151   Jackson also felt that in the pursuit of his moralistic ideals that 
Carter had ignored the imperatives of power and geopolitics and the “unsettling mixture 
of moralism, malaise, and retrenchment” created contempt for U.S. weakness.152   
Carter’s competence and the deleterious effect of his self conscious moralism on 
American foreign policy came under more direct attack in November of 1978 when an 
article by Republican congressman John Anderson, entitled “Faith, Virtue, and Honor 
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Are Not Enough” appeared in the Christian magazine Christianity Today.  Anderson 
explained that the president’s emphasis on virtue and honesty, while admirable, was no 
substitute for competence and a realistic appreciation of the complexities of world 
politics.153  A more subtle, and perhaps more damming, point was that Carter has actually 
been dishonest and misrepresented himself.  Anderson accused Carter of being too vague 
on the issues during his campaign and “soft-pedaled ideology and instead appealed for 
support on the basis of that amorphous quality he liked to call ‘character’.”154  Once in 
office however, “Carter had a huge agenda tucked away in his coat pocket,” that he 
attempted to deliver to Congress, “with amazing naiveté about what it takes to get 
something passed in that complex, independent body.”155  Anderson ended his article 
with an observation that Carter sometimes exhibits two different personalities, one of 
excessive moralism and one that advocates “politics-as-usual.”156   
Human rights, then, represented one of Carter’s biggest political traps, partly of 
his own making, and partly one created by the various civilian and governmental groups 
that used the issue as their weapon against détente.  The moral imperatives created by a 
human rights movement, and its emotional and psychological implications, meant that it 
was intrinsically at odds with any attempt to maintain a business as usual attitude with a 
nation that was, in fact, committing blatant human rights violations against its own 
citizens.  That same nation was also the sworn ideological enemy of the United States and 
had a massive conventional military and nuclear arsenal to back them up compounded the 
incompatibility of human rights with détente.    
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David Skidmore has aptly explained why Carter tried to use human rights as a 
Cold War weapon and the nature of the problem with this strategy.  Aside from his need 
to respond to the growing public interest in the issue, Carter was interested in using 
human rights as a way to win support for his foreign policy reforms.  Also, in the face of 
variables not under Carter’s control, (namely the rise in Soviet power, weakness of the 
dollar, and the rise of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), the international 
environment, and America’s options, seem more constrained.  An ideological focus on 
human rights was one way to retrench in a cost effective manner that put the nation’s 
adversaries on the defensive.157 Skidmore acknowledges that Carter’s move to the hard 
line by mid-1978 was in large part due to the influences of elite opposition groups like 
the Committee on the Present Danger and their congressional allies, along with “broad 
ideological resistance in the society at large.”158  This of course means the public, and the 
growing anti-Soviet feeling among the American people.   Skidmore acknowledges that it 
was this factor above all that was the undoing of Carter’s initial vision for Soviet policy 
(drastic arms cuts, modest human rights pressure, maintenance of détente) and the cause 
of his hardline reversal, “back upon both the legitimative techniques and associated 
policies of the cold war era in an effort to shore up his political position at home.”159   
Both Skidmore and Thomas Nichols see this development as the bridge linking 
the Soviet policies of Carter and Reagan toward the death of détente, and the return to 
confrontation.160  Nichols observes that human rights and arms control was a doomed 
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marriage and that Carter never realized that “moralizing on one issue would jeopardize 
progress on the other, and he continued to believe that he could castigate the Soviets on 
human rights but still manage to forge ahead on SALT II.”161  Skidmore explains why 
human rights, as a political weapon, was not a powerful enough weapon to influence 
Soviet behavior, namely because it “did not possess the ideological power, as 
anticommunism once had, to unite the country around a common vision,” and was 
conceptually, “often ambiguous, sometimes proved divisive…and held only a tenuous 
relationship to many of Carter’s more pragmatic policies.”162    
One final problem that neither author is that along with its lack of power 
domestically, human rights lacked the power to force the kind of changes needed to alter 
Soviet behavior.  Granted, the Soviet leadership did take great umbrage at Carter’s 
human rights rhetoric because it questioned the legitimacy of their government and 
ideology, and this had profound long term social consequences within the communist 
world in the form of growing discontent with Soviet hegemony, and the communist 
system itself, throughout the communist world.  But these consequences were not readily 
apparent in the late 1970s and, more importantly, while human rights questioned Soviet 
legitimacy it did not threaten the source of that legitimacy.   
That source was the Soviet government’s ability to use force and coercion to 
achieve certain ends, in other words, their military power.  Power projection vis-a-vis 
military strength was, from the Brezhnev regime until the ascendancy of Mikhail 
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Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s first political and economic priority.  Ronald Reagan has 
often received almost sole credit for bringing competitive pressure to bear on the Soviet 
Union and thereby causing an already wobbly political system to topple over under the 
strain of a new arms race.  However, that trend toward renewed confrontation and 
competition began under Jimmy Carter and was just one factor that linked the two 
presidents in the continuum of Soviet/American policy change.             
 
 
 
                  
 
CHAPTER 4 
On November 5, 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his discovery of a 
fundamental fact about American politics and political leadership in the late 20th century 
on which historians and political scientists would not begin to elaborate until some years 
later.  Namely, he had discovered the influence, the almost symbiotic relationship, of 
American think tanks and American foreign policy.  Speaking to Secretary of State 
George Shultz and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, Gorbachev held in his 
hand a book published by Stanford University’s Hoover Institute entitled, The United 
States in the 1980s.  By 1985 Hoover had long been one of the more respected 
conservative think tanks in the United States.  Its fellows included Nobel laureates like 
economist Milton Friedman, historian Robert Conquest, and Secretary Shultz himself.  
Holding the book, Gorbachev claimed that he knew what the Reagan administration’s 
“game plan” was and began explaining how the assumptions and predictions about the 
Soviet Union contained in the book were all wrong.163   
Regardless of how correct Gorbachev may have been about the book’s analysis, it 
is true that, as George Schultz admitted, “Ronald Reagan had looked to the Hoover 
Institution for help in his administration.”164  Indeed, aside from Secretary Schultz, 
several important members of the Reagan administration were drawn from the ranks of 
organizations like Hoover and interest groups like the Committee on the Present Danger.  
Sometimes the associations overlapped, but in any case, some of the most influential 
people in the administration were also members of the very organizations that were the 
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constant critics of détente, and of Carter’s Soviet policy.  Martin Anderson, one of 
Reagan’s domestic and economic policy advisers and a Hoover Senior Fellow, explained 
that the Hoover book that so concerned Gorbachev, “was just one part of an intellectual 
revolution that has been building and growing stronger-for decades.”  The events of 
1980, specifically election of Ronald Reagan as president, “were a political expression of 
powerful forces that have been growing and deepening in the United States for many 
years.”165  
The meeting on that November day was a preparatory talk for the upcoming 
summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva, Switzerland, and the Soviet 
leader drew another correct conclusion about recent U.S. foreign policy history.  The 
subject of SALT II was raised as an example of an unratified American agreement, and 
Secretary Schultz replied that SALT II had been withdrawn from consideration only after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Gorbachev, incensed, declared that, “SALT II was 
dead and buried even before Afghanistan….The U.S. got out of SALT II because you 
didn’t want to be constrained by it…You ought to put that one in mothballs.  It’s old 
hat.”166  In this, Gorbachev was correct, because as much as Martin Anderson and other 
conservatives may like to believe that what occurred in foreign policy during the Reagan 
years was a “revolution” the reality is that it was closer to evolution.  Policy changes in 
the last two years of the Carter presidency were built upon and accentuated during the 
early years of the Reagan administration.  Certainly those accentuations were important, a 
different kind of president than Reagan could have made radically different decisions.   
The evolving hard line and traditional Cold War posture that developed during the Carter 
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years could have been reversed.  Nevertheless, Reagan’s get tough strategy with the 
Soviet Union, the wave on which he rode into the White House, formed and grew during 
the administration of his predecessor, and it would build strength and finally crest by the 
mid 1980s under his leadership.     
By the beginning of 1979 developments did not seem to bode well for the chances 
of a peaceful world and a stable environment for U.S. national security in general.  In 
hindsight it is clear that détente, and along with it SALT II, was dead, even if the Carter 
administration did not know it or want to accept it yet.  The growing problem of the 
Middle East and Southwest Africa was apparent early in the year when the January 15, 
1979 issue of Time magazine featured the “Crescent of Crisis,” stretching from Ethiopia 
to Pakistan, with the Soviet bear looming in the background, as its cover story.  The story 
focused primarily on the Carter administration’s mishandling of the Iranian situation and 
the problems of Shah Pahlavi’s U.S. friendly, but repressive and unpopular, rule of 
Iran.167   
The article included in its analysis the opportunistic Soviet interest in these 
various Middle Eastern crisis areas, but ironically, relatively little space was devoted to 
the situation in Afghanistan.  This is all the more ironic considering that as early as the 
initial Shiite uprising, against the Taraki government, in March of 1979, , the CIA had 
already foreseen trouble from the growing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.  By 
September 14, CIA Director Stansfield Turner warned Carter, in a memo, that Soviet 
leaders were possibly ready to commit their own military forces to prevent the collapse of 
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the newly installed Amin regime.168  As former CIA director Robert Gates has explained, 
the Carter administration had been aware of increasing Soviet involvement in Afghan 
affairs for almost a year before the invasion, and as early as April 1979 the CIA 
concluded that if the Soviets were determined to keep their puppet rulers (then Taraki, 
later Amin) in power, then perhaps U.S. covert assistance to Moslem resistance 
movements “would raise the costs to the Soviets and inflame Moslem opinion against 
them in many countries.”  The range of assistance options included anti-Soviet 
propaganda, direct financial assistance, weapons, and training. 169   After the Soviet 
invasion on December 25,1979 the Carter covert program dramatically expanded to 
supply all sorts of weapons and support, and tens of millions of dollars, for the 
mujahedin, the Muslim freedom fighters. 
If this strategy sounds more indicative of what the United States pursued in the 
1980s, it is because it was just one policy initiative under Carter that would expand under 
the Reagan administration.  It would find its most official and concrete expression in one 
of the most important foreign policy documents of the Reagan years, National Security 
Decision Directive Number 75 (NSDD-75), entitled “U.S. Relations With the USSR.”  
Dated January 17, 1983, this directive outlined a broad Soviet policy that included 
assisting Third World nations threatened by the Soviet Union.  Afghanistan, in particular, 
ranks in this document as one of the important weaknesses of the “Soviet Empire” and 
that specifically, “The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for 
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withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets’ political, military, and other costs remain high 
while the occupation continues.”170      
Those intended costs that link the agendas of the two administrations were 
political-- discrediting the USSR in the Middle East and simultaneously rebuilding U.S. 
credibility to protect friends and economic-- increasing the “cost of empire” for the 
Soviet Union’s already limping economy.  Under Reagan there was more emphasis on 
the latter goal, but the continuity is there nevertheless, one initiative led to the other.  As 
Robert Gates puts it, “Carter did not intend to worsen their difficulties through economic 
warfare, but the policies he pursued in response to other events had that practical 
effect.”171  Gates also asserts that the Kremlin itself saw great continuity between Carter 
and Reagan’s approach and that, “Carter prepared the ground for Reagan in the strategic 
arena…”172  
In the more immediate sense for Carter, this policy initiative in Afghanistan led to 
the formulation the Carter Doctrine in January of 1980, officially articulated by Carter 
himself in a State of the Union address on January 23.  The doctrine in its short form was 
fairly straightforward; “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force.”173  This constitutes the most strongly worded piece of declaratory policy of the 
entire Carter administration and was, by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s own admission, modeled 
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on the Truman Doctrine signifying a clear return to traditional cold war confrontation.  
Although not made official until after the Soviet invasion, the doctrine’s concepts had 
been formulated and discussed as early as mid 1979, and was largely the work of 
Brzezinski himself, and his military assistant, General William Odom.174   
Jimmy Carter had finally decided to take his national security advisor’s advice 
and became a “President Truman” instead of a “President Wilson,” Carter’s true idol.175  
This tough turn would prove too little too late.  By the beginning of 1980 the combination 
of a stagnant economy, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
had already doomed Carter’s chances for reelection.  Ironically he had in fact finally 
become the “new Truman” that, according to John Ehrman, the neo-conservative 
Democrats had been looking for throughout the 1970s.  Jimmy Carter had responded to 
the pressures and influences of the neo-conservative movement, but only fitfully.  
Although he became the foreign policy president they had wanted in his last year in 
office, “the neoconservatives were effectively divorced from the Democratic party by 
February 1980.”176  Not finding the Democrat they wanted, “they embraced the 
Republican party and Ronald Reagan as the best alternative.”177    
Nevertheless, an important intellectual link between the two administrations to 
consider was the developing neoconservative position in the late 1970s on the subject of 
undemocratic dictatorships and authoritarian regimes and their advantage over 
communist governments.  Probably no single neoconservative expressed this lesser of 
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two evils argument more cogently than Jeane Kirkpatrick, one time Democrat and 
member of the Committee on the Present Danger.  Kirkpatrick wrote about the important 
differences between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, especially the communist 
variety.  But it was not until 1979 that she produced her most celebrated work on the 
subject, her article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” now considered one of the 
most important writings in American neoconservative thought.   
Published in Commentary magazine in November of 1979, the article represents 
the intellectual glue that holds the Carter Doctrine and Reagan’s NSDD-75 together.  
Kirkpatrick identified the most urgent problem with current American foreign policy as 
the need to formulate, “a morally and strategically acceptable, and politically realistic, 
program for dealing with non-democratic governments who are threatened by Soviet-
sponsored subversion.”178  Kirkpatrick used the Shah and Somoza as her main cases in 
points to demonstrate how Carter’s excessive moralism and rigid idealism had led to the 
fall of U.S. friendly regimes to communist movements that held less promise for 
eventually evolving into democracies than the authoritarian alternatives.  In sum, 
Kirkpatrick argued that in both Iran and Nicaragua, the Carter administration, in pursuit 
of some vague unattainable perfection, had sacrificed the good.  A key theme was that the 
world cannot be democratized over night, and that the development of American style 
democracy is a process that demands patience while the worse alternative is guarded 
against.    
The new policy focus expressed by Carter on January 23, 1980, which would 
come to be called the “Carter Doctrine,” represented a tacit acknowledgement of 
Kirkpatrick’s arguments.  This declaration implied the support for friendly dictatorships 
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that Kirkpatrick called for, and was intended to reassure friends and allies that they could 
count on support from the United States.  This commitment to the protection of the 
“Crescent of Crisis” included, ironically enough, the same Iranian government that only 
the previous November had taken American embassy employees as hostages.  The 
doctrine also legitimized the already in progress covert assistance to the Afghan 
resistance, a resistance which contained a significant Shiite element, the same strain of 
repressive, fundamentalist Islam practiced in Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeni.  In fact, 
by mid 1980, both the Carter administration and the Khomeni government were 
supporting the Afghan resistance, albeit in different ways and to different degrees.179  
Although these political/religious groups did not necessarily constitute the friendly 
dictatorships that Kirkpatrick had in mind, they were at least anti-Soviet, and clearly this 
fact overrode any human rights complications that may have given the administration 
pause at an earlier time.  More importantly, the Carter Doctrine represented the 
culmination of a concerted push, both from within and outside of the administration, to 
return to the traditional cold war “realism” that was desired by the neo-conservatives, and 
increasingly by the American people.180  
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  By the time NSDD-75 was issued on January 17, 1983, Jeane Kirkpatrick had 
reached the highest point of her official influence in U.S. foreign policy as the U.S. 
ambassador to the United Nations.  The link between the Carter Doctrine and NSDD-75 
is fairly explicit, mainly because it is made explicit by NSDD-75 itself.  The Middle East 
was now a major “arena of engagement” in the administration’s strategy of “Shaping the 
Soviet Environment.”181  The spectrum of policy change had effectively moved from 
theory/opinion to its adoption under Carter characterized by a primarily defensive posture 
to a more ambitious offensive goal under the Reagan administration.  In NSDD-75, 
supporting the Third World (with a specific focus on Afghanistan) was no longer just a 
hedge against Soviet expansion, it was now part of a strategy to change Soviet behavior 
by increasing the costs of their empire.182  Moreover, by 1983, America’s support to the 
mujahedin had moved well past the “covert” stage in any meaningful sense, and was the 
biggest foreign policy “secret” known, and largely accepted without complaint, by the 
American public.      
Another important link between NSDD-75 and the intellectual currents shaping 
foreign policy is in how the scope of the contest with the Soviets was conceived in terms 
of time.  It seems clear that at least one way that the incoming Reagan administration was 
prepared to differ fundamentally from Carter’s was that it conceived a definite timeline 
for the remainder of the superpower contest, with the United States as the winner.  Fred 
Charles Ikle was one of the Hoover contributors to the book The United States in the 
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1980s and in his chapter, “Arms Control and National Defense” he contended that “in the 
next five to ten years three new challenges clearly will endanger America.”183  Ikle 
became the Under Secretary for Defense Policy in the Reagan administration, and those 
three new challenges were: continued growth in Soviet military power, U.S. and allied 
dependence on Middle East oil, and the problems of the West’s nuclear strategy that “will 
be aggravated by adverse trends in the global military balance.”184           
Three years later, NSDD-75 would similarly state that, “The coming 5-10 years 
will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by 
continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which the U.S. finds 
unacceptable.”185  In the early years of his administration Reagan and CIA Director 
William Casey who, like Reagan, was a member of the Committee on the Present 
Danger, felt a sense of inevitability in the collapse of the Soviet economy and perceived 
that an end to the Cold War was in sight.186  This perception that an endgame to the Cold 
War was in progress was unique to the Reagan administration, but the concept did not 
originate with Reagan himself.  Rather, like the other arguments and currents of thought 
discussed here, the idea percolated upward into government policy making from a body 
of various neoconservative intellectuals.  NSDD-75 is one of the most important foreign 
policy documents of the Reagan administration and of the history of American foreign 
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policy in general.  It was nothing less than America’s game plan, roughly ten years in the 
making, for winning the cold war.    
 
                                                   
                                                      
CHAPTER 5 
Well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Carter’s subsequent removal 
of SALT II from Senate consideration, the treaty’s death seemed a forgone conclusion.  A 
July 20, 1979 issue of National Review featured a cartoon of President Carter holding a 
dove labeled “SALT” standing beside a hunter labeled “Senate” clutching a shotgun and 
yelling “Pull!”187  Another cartoon in their June 22, 1979 issue featured a delighted 
Brezhnev licking a sucker with the American flag painted on it in one hand and holding a 
salt shaker in the other.188  The latter cartoon was featured as part of an article by retired 
foreign service officer Norman Hannah entitled “SALT II: No Meeting of the Minds.”  
The article was, in one respect, predictably an anti-SALT commentary, but it differed 
from many articles on the subject in that it refrained from the typical technical minutia of 
nuclear weapons and strategic theory.   
Instead, it focused much more on what Hannah saw as important “asymmetries” 
between the nature of the American and Soviet systems.  Specifically, he discussed the 
asymmetries of information access to verify compliance in SALT II stipulations.  Hannah 
pointed out that the U.S. represented a much more open society than the Soviet Union 
and that the USSR had total access to that information contained in publications like 
Time, Aviation Week, and the Congressional Record.189  The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, was, “the most rigidly closed totalitarian Leviathan in history” and, as such, the 
U.S. was restricted to electronic and satellite monitoring.190    
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Hannah also pointed out that because the United States was an open society it was 
subject to a kind of political “feedback” into its system because of the promise that SALT 
held for a reduced risk of war and reduced military spending.  This, he argued, resulted in 
the lack of a replacement for America’s aging B-52 bombers, and a lack of deployment of 
other important weapons systems.  The Soviet Union, a closed, totalitarian society, was 
not subject to this feedback.191  Lastly, and most importantly to Hannah, there was the 
asymmetry of understanding of what détente meant and what it stood for.  Quoting from 
Soviet publications like Kommunist and Red Star, he pointed out that for the Soviets 
détente was only a part of a larger strategy for victory over the West as part of their vision 
of the inexorable historical process toward world socialism.  In sum, Hannah’s article 
took a decidedly ideological look at SALT and détente, and it suggested a frame of mind 
that certainly guided Reagan during his early years in office.  Specifically, it suggested 
that, the Soviet Union, because of its political/social system and ideological view, is 
systemically and intrinsically opposed to any meaningful idea of arms control and peace.  
Therefore, the Soviet system must change fundamentally for progress to occur.  They 
were  the problem, not us.     
This type of commentary had of course been the stock in trade of National Review 
since its founding in 1955 by William F. Buckley, Jr.  Writers for the magazine, as 
epitomized by Buckley, were intellectuals of impressive erudition, insight, and wit, and 
through the magazine they promulgated the mainstream conservative critique of 
American politics and life to a general readership.  Among those devoted readers was 
Ronald Reagan who, from his years as governor of California, was an admirer of 
Buckley.  He appeared on Buckley’s talk show, Firing Line, five times between 1967 and 
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1980.  According to Buckley himself, Reagan admitted to having read National Review 
for twenty five years, and once expressed thanks for, “a fund of great knowledge that I’ve 
acquired,” from the magazine.192  The critique that National Review provided of the 
Soviet Union was invariably one that juxtaposed its system with a belief in American 
exceptionalism.  In other words, the American way of life was not just an alternate 
ideology, or one life style among many, it was better than any others, especially 
communism, and because of that America would ultimately prevail.   
This influence on Reagan’s thinking helps explain the similarities and differences 
between his ethos and that of his predecessor.  Both believed in the inherent goodness of 
America and its founding values.  Both believed that the nation should champion those 
values abroad, which included an emphasis on human rights.  Carter, however, held these 
beliefs while continuing to view the world through the traditional cold war prism that 
assumed the virtual permanence of a bi-polar world.  This precluded the idea of 
pressuring the Soviet Union for meaningful change through the use of competitive 
pressure as adopted by the Reagan administration.  Carter focused on peace even if it 
meant preservation of the status quo, Reagan focused on change, even if it meant creating 
a tense, dangerous confrontation between the superpowers.  Of course, Reagan would 
also eventually benefit from something that Carter never enjoyed, a powerful partner on 
the other side who also believed in change: Mikhail Gorbachev.      
That there were anti-SALT articles in publications like National Review or 
Commentary is not surprising, although the frequency and length of these articles did 
increase as the Senate debate grew more intense in1979, especially after the SALT II 
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signing in Vienna in June.  However, by 1979 even relatively nonpartisan academic 
defenders of the treaty were beginning to admit that SALT negotiations, I and II, had 
failed to fulfill the expectations of a safer, more peaceful world that advocates of the 
treaties had promised.  One of the best examples of this emerging view is in an article in 
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, hardly a conservative publication, by Michael 
Mandelbaum, a professor of government at the Center for Science and International 
Affairs at Harvard University.  The article defended the SALT treaty, but it was also 
deeply pessimistic about what the treaty would actually accomplish.  To begin with, he 
argued that regardless of what agreements were reached, “There is no ironclad guarantee 
that the Soviets will not behave in belligerent reckless fashion in the 1980s.”  He pointed 
out that both superpowers lived at the mercy of each other’s sanity, a feature of the 
nuclear age that could, “only be eliminated by political and technical changes more 
drastic then either side has yet made or seems willing to make.”193   
He also cited the violations of the spirit of SALT by both nations as they 
exploited loopholes in the agreements to improve their strategic arsenals both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.  As Mandelbaum put it, “The spirit of SALT has hardly 
been one of restraint.  It is perhaps aptly captured by the phrase…’everything not 
prohibited is required’”194  Furthermore, he argued, the attempt at “linkage” of SALT to 
other commitments and expectations had failed to moderate Soviet behavior.  He 
conceded that SALT did represent a modest form of cooperation that gave the strategic 
balance a measure of predictability and had served to lessen the chances of nuclear war 
somewhat.  But these were grudging admissions, and the thrust of his argument can be 
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summed up by his advice to the reader that, “It is important to be clear about what SALT 
cannot hope to accomplish.”195   
The consequences of unmet expectations, in the form of disillusionment and 
political dissent, is an important conceptual link between Jeremi Suri’s explanation of the 
rise of détente and analysis of its death offered here.  As Suri explains, it was the efforts 
of world leaders in the early 1960s to transcend cold war divisions and quell domestic 
unrest that led to rising expectations that none of them could fulfill.  In particular, 
attempts by American presidents like Kennedy and Johnson in the form of foreign 
intervention were “profoundly self-defeating.”196  The resulting discontent reached its 
apex by 1968, forcing a move toward détente by great power leaders to reassert their 
legitimacy.  Likewise, by 1980 the unmet promises of détente forced Carter and Reagan 
to move back to confrontation and the hard line.  Reagan’s landslide victory in November 
that year was, to paraphrase Suri, the expression of unmet popular expectations, 
disappointment, and fear that had coalesced around an infrastructure and language of 
dissent.197  Jimmy Carter’s response to this dissent was too little too late to save him 
politically, but in doing so he did lay some policy groundwork for his successor.     
A particular cultural current in America beginning in the late 1970s that bears 
acknowledging is the growth, or perhaps resurgence in, the public’s literacy and 
awareness of matters pertaining to nuclear warfare and national security issues.  In 1978 a 
war novel written by General Sir John Hackett, former commander of the British Army 
of the Rhine, and a team of other NATO military experts called The Third World War: 
                                                 
195 Ibid 19.   
196 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest, 3-4. 
197 Ibid, 3.  The passage I am paraphrasing reads, “Popular expectations coalesced around what I call an 
‘international language of dissent.’ ”   
  86
August 1985 was published.  As the title suggests, Hackett and company told the story of 
a hypothetical war between the Soviet Union and the West breaking out in the mid-
1980s.  The scenario described is basically modeled on the doctrine of flexible response 
in which the conflict begins as a conventional clash of arms in central Europe that 
steadily escalates to a limited nuclear exchange in which Birmingham, England (hit first 
of course), and the Soviet city of Minsk are destroyed.  The style and content of the novel 
prefigured the work of more popular authors in the 1980s like Tom Clancy and was 
indicative of a new kind of fiction called faction because of its blend of a fictional 
premise with factual technical details.198  
Hackett’s background gave the book an air of knowledgeable authority, and his 
central argument was that a built up and technologically capable conventional military 
force is needed if nuclear war is to be avoided.  Hackett’s book was meant as a wake up 
call, and he criticized those, “who argue for the reduction of defense expenditure in the 
countries of the West not only seem to live in a land of total make-believe, but refuse to 
give the Marxist-Leninists who govern the USSR any credit either for meaning what they 
say…or for knowing what they are doing.”199  The book sold more than 190,000 
hardbound copies in the United States, and 3 million copies in 10 languages world 
wide.200  The book remained among the top twenty best selling fiction works from 1978 
to 1980, and in December of 1983, President Reagan named the book as one of the most 
important books he had read that year.201   
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Hackett’s book soon spawned imitators, many of who were also retired military 
officers who wrote in either a fictional setting or in a nonfiction polemical, alarmist, vein 
about the looming Soviet threat.202  A significant nonfiction book of this type was Inside 
the Soviet Army written by a defected Soviet Army officer under the pseudonym Viktor 
Suvorov (real name, Valdimir Rezun) and published in 1982.  In this book Suvorov 
provided his explanations of Soviet military thinking, which included a highly 
incredulous attitude, bordering on ridicule, about the American idea of flexible response 
and gradual escalation.  Suvorov assured his readers that Soviet military doctrine was 
firmly rooted in the idea of the massive offensive, and that nuclear weapons were not 
considered weapons of last resort, but rather an important part of the initial stages of an 
offensive.203  In another section of the book called “Operation Détente” he explains that 
the peace movement in the East was encouraged by Moscow, and that it had the same 
goal as the movement in the West, namely the prevention of new missile installations in 
the West.  In this same section, he invokes the history of Soviet/Finnish relations, 
asserting that, “If they [the Kremlin] could not bring the Finns to their knees by fighting, 
they decided they would do it by peaceful methods.”204     
Like Hackett’s book and others, Inside the Soviet Army was regularly advertised 
in a variety of magazines either by itself or often as part of a book club offers.  Also like 
Hackett’s book, the rank and occupation of the author lent credibility to the author’s 
conclusions.  The salient point here is that these books were written for the non-
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professional, general public, and from the late 1970s onward, they introduced that public 
(which did sometimes include important leadership figures) to subjects and issues that 
had largely been forgotten during the previous ten to fifteen years.205  These books were a 
response to a growing public demand for knowledge on these matters, and they helped 
intensify the cultural attention that would first support a military buildup under Carter 
and Reagan, and develop into nuclear war anxiety by the mid-1980s.206 
 
  THE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION CONTINUUM  
On July 25, 1980 President Carter signed a directive that laid the foundations for 
the military buildup and modernization under Ronald Reagan.  The Carter directive, 
officially Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), established objectives for making the 
nation’s strategic nuclear forces more capable and resilient in the event of nuclear 
conflict thereby enhancing the credibility of the United States’ nuclear deterrent.207  This 
initiative was built upon and enhanced by the Reagan administration and cited in its 
National Security Decision Directive 13 (NSDD-13), written in October 1981.208  
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PD-59 set requirements that could not be met at the time of its signing, and 
NSDD-13 was an attempt, as Jeffery Richelson explained, to match capabilities to 
strategy.209  In fact, Richelson’s 1983 article, in The Journal of Strategic Studies, is 
probably still the best explanation of the link in strategic military policy between Carter 
and Reagan.  As such, there is no need to reiterate the details and particulars of the 
directives that are already so ably explained by Richelson, but it is necessary to mention 
what the general requirements of PD-59 were and how NSDD-13 responded to those 
needs.  
PD-59 called for improvements in command, control and communications 
systems, what in military shorthand is referred to as C3.  This enhancement would allow 
for more flexible targeting as the battlefield situation changed rapidly and for more 
reliable communications with strategic assets, mainly bombers and submarines, that 
could be recalled, if need be, after receiving an attack order.  The directive also called for 
increased emphasis on striking “hard” targets like ICBM sites and leadership command 
and control bunkers.  This, in turn, called for the deployment of more accurate warheads 
for land and submarine based ICBMs, including the newer MX missile that had already 
been approved by Carter in June of 1979.  Another requirement of PD-59 was that the 
nation’s nuclear force capable of surviving an initial attack.  This demanded an increase 
in production of the newer Trident D5 SLBM and the Air Launched Cruise Missile 
(ALCM) to compensate for the perceived vulnerability of the land based ICBM force.210 
The Reagan Administration enthusiastically sought to meet these military 
demands and built upon them in a way that seemed to consider the goals of PD-59 and 
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conclude, “not bad, but not quite enough.”  Richelson’s article effectively demonstrates 
that, like the other political trends discussed here, that there was not a sharp divide 
between the two administrations.  There were some differences, however, that were, 
paradoxically, the result of the same conservative forces that account for the similarities.   
A primary difference was doctrinal, in that PD-59 stressed the idea of military 
endurance and the ability to fight a prolonged conflict so as to inflict high costs on the 
Soviet Union.211  The Reagan modernization program focused on fighting a nuclear war 
in such a manner as to end hostilities as soon as possible and, most significantly, to 
prevail and be in a position of advantage after hostilities stopped.  In August of 1982 
Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger declared that any Secretary of Defense that did 
not intend to prevail “ought to be impeached.”212  Two months later the Washington Post 
reported details of a “five year guidance” from Weinberger to the military that was leaked 
to the paper.  Part of that guidance was the requirement that if nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union should take place, the U.S. must be able to, “seek earliest termination of hostilities 
on terms favorable to the United States.”  It also directed that the nation should maintain 
a reserve of nuclear forces, “sufficient for trans-and post-attack protection and 
coercion.”213     
Operationally, this translated into approval of the B-1 bomber for deployment 
with SAC by 1986.  This decision to deploy with this new aircraft, made in October  
1981, did not lead to the sacrifice of any other weapons system.  The B-1 was designed to 
carry the ALCM and other types of nuclear ordinance, such as the newly developed B-83 
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free fall bomb which was specifically designed for high-speed, low-level delivery on 
supersonic aircraft, like the B-1, against the type of hard targets that were a priority of 
PD-59.214  The B-1 was meant to serve as a penetrating bomber that could strike targets 
deep within Soviet territory.  Moreover, the B-1B delivered to SAC in 1986 was a much 
more advanced version than the prototypes cancelled by Carter, and development of the 
Advanced Technology Bomber (B-2 Stealth), another Carter era initiative, was 
continued.   
Existing B-52s continued to be upgraded, and a smaller version of the MX, called 
the “Midgetman,” was to be added to the land based ICBM arsenal.  The expansion of the 
U.S. Navy to a 600 ship force and the continued development of the Trident D5 SLBM 
was also ordered.215  The emphasis on better C3 systems complimented and enhanced the 
flexibility of all U.S. bombers and subs by making their recall, or retargeting, more 
reliable and assured their efficacy in the,  “trans-and post-attack protection and coercion” 
scenario envisioned by Weinberger.   
Thus, the U.S. strategic modernization program was a continuum that moved from 
a trade off oriented incrementalism under Jimmy Carter, to the buy and deploy it all 
attitude of the Reagan Administration, which sought a fully comprehensive range of 
strategic capabilities to project an aggressive and confident military posture.  This new 
view was based on the belief by many important administration officials, including 
Reagan himself, that the traditional deterrence concept of Mutual Assured Destruction 
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had either outlived its usefulness, or was essentially immoral, dangerous, and 
unnecessarily fatalistic.216   
Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle was also influential in this anti-MAD 
viewpoint, having spoken and written against it before becoming a member of the 
administration.217  Once entering office, he initiated studies, the conclusions of which 
supported the doctrines of PD-59 and suggested the military needs to be met by NSDD-
13.218  There is every reason to believe that if Jimmy Carter had won re-election that he 
would have pursued a similar type of military buildup, albeit not necessarily to the same 
degree and scale as Reagan.  A comparison of Carter’s proposed spending plans for the 
years 1982 to 1986 and the actual spending of the Reagan administration during those 
same years shows a steady increase in both budgets, with Reagan’s actual outlays being, 
on average, about 37 billion dollars more than that projected by Carter.219    
The apparent paradox of Reagan’s abhorrence of MAD and his simultaneous 
military build up was resolved, at least in Reagan’s mind, by the concept of “negotiation 
from strength.”220  In other words, a strong military position was needed to gain respect 
and negotiating power, which included the “bargaining chips” that an increased weapons 
inventory would provide.  Put another way, it meant; get tough and strong first so that 
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you can play nice later, risk free, and with real leverage.  Jack Matlock explains that this 
concept went beyond military strength however, and included the idea of a revitalized 
U.S. economy, and “a renewed sense of national purpose” that would strengthen 
America’s political will.221  This concept was a part of the overall strategy of NSDD-75 
both in its ideological focus and in its goal of “Maximizing Restraining Leverage on 
Soviet Behavior.”222   
 
            SDI AND INF     
In The United States in the 1980s, physicist, Hoover Institute senior fellow, and 
Committee on the Present Danger member, Dr. Edward Teller contributed a chapter 
called “Technology: The Imbalance of Power.”  Teller explained the importance and 
inevitability of the march of technology in the history of warfare.  Using historical 
examples ranging from World War I to the present day strategic nuclear arms race, he 
explained how every new offensive technology had spawned the need for an equally high 
tech defense against it, and vice versa.223  Teller pointed out that technological innovation 
had often resulted from a desire to break stalemate situations as well.  He discussed the 
significant major weapons systems in the history of modern warfare; the rifle, the 
machine gun, the modern navy, the airplane, rockets and missiles, and nuclear weapons.  
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He ends his historical discussion by touting the promise of “Radar, Lasers, and Beyond” 
to provide an effective defense against an attacker’s ICBMs.224   
The second part of his essay is “A Program for the 1980s” in which the familiar 
themes in the conservative critique of the U.S./Soviet strategic balance were reiterated: 
the balance is in the Soviet’s favor, many refuse to acknowledge that fact, the SALT 
treaties are pointless, and that a renewed focus on improving America’s technological 
superiority will help redress the nation’s dangerous position.  He also mentions the need 
to negotiate from strength, but most importantly he concludes by returning to the issue of 
“future weapons” and technological progress for the “influence for war or for peace.”  
Teller counsels the reader that, “throughout history the term ‘ultimate weapon’ has been 
used again and again; just as frequently, that ultimate weapon has been replaced by a new 
candidate.  In reality, the limits of damage from weapons have always been set, not by 
weapons, but by the intentions of those who wield them.”225  
Three years after the Hoover volume’s publication, Ronald Reagan, in one of his 
most important speeches, echoed these same themes.  On March 23, 1983 he presented 
his interpretation of Teller’s vision to the American people in the form of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI).  SDI was not just a vision of one type of weapon, rather, the 
program would involve the development of a variety of systems ranging from exotic 
ideas involving orbiting laser armed battle stations, to “kinetic energy” weapons that 
would destroy a missile or warhead by directly impacting it using advanced “smart 
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bullets.”  The various weapons systems envisioned were based in space, on the ground, or 
on aircraft.226   
Like Teller, Reagan assured America that “current technology has attained a level 
of sophistication where it’s reasonable for us to begin the effort,” the purpose of which 
was, “our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.” 227  
In his memoirs, Reagan sounded even more like Teller, and recalled telling the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff that, “Every offensive weapon ever invented by man has resulted in the 
creation of a defense against it…” and then asking them if it were not possible to likewise 
create a weapon to defend against ICBMs.228   
Although, strangely, Reagan did not mention Teller in his own memoirs, the 
esteemed physicist’s influence on Reagan’s thinking about ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) is well documented in the personal histories of several members of the 
administration.  Ed Meese characterizes Teller as a “key influence in Reagan’s thinking” 
about the promise of BMD, and that Teller himself had, “a long history of bucking 
fashionable opinion.”229  George Schultz asserts that the basic vision of SDI was all 
Reagan’s own, but also acknowledges that Teller was an influence as early as 1967 when 
Reagan, as governor of California, visited the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
where Teller briefed him on the latest research on how to defend against nuclear attack 
by using nuclear explosives.  Reagan listened intently, asked many questions, and as 
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Schultz says, “This may have become the first gleam in Ronald Reagan’s eye of what 
later became the Strategic Defense Initiative.”230  Reagan’s science advisor, George 
Keyworth, was recommended to the administration by Teller and, according to Martin 
Anderson, Keyworth regarded Teller, “with awe” and as such, “we were not surprised to 
find Keyworth generally supportive of missile defense.”231 Moreover, a diverse group of 
Reagan administration officials and personal associates also supported BMD, some were 
Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) members, others were simply Republican or 
Democratic conservatives.232     
Although it would be tempting to conclude that the Hoover Institute members 
mentioned here constituted a kind of “brain trust” for Ronald Reagan that directly shaped 
the president’s views and policy decision, it would be more accurate to say that these 
individuals provided a scholarly, intellectual backing and legitimacy for basic beliefs that 
Reagan already held.  When Reagan switched his party affiliation from Democrat to 
Republican in 1962, the Hoover Institute was still only an “underfunded library with a 
modest publishing program,” and nowhere near the intellectual force it would become by 
the late 1970s.233  By Reagan’s own account the political views he would take to the 
White House; the virtues of free market capitalism, small government, low taxes, anti-
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communism, strong national defense, and a philosophy rooted in American 
exceptionalism, were already well formed before he ever met the first Hoover fellow.234   
The Hoover Institute’s influence in the Reagan administration was the 
culmination of a process beginning in the early 1970s whereby a conservative 
infrastructure of policy critique and dissent was built.  This dissent was just as confident 
and revolutionary as that of the 1960s, and like those earlier rebels, “The conservatives 
were not afraid of invoking large ideals and of setting them in sweeping historical 
contexts in which grand ideas clashed and struggled.”235  Even more fundamentally, the 
Hoover Institute’s thorough insinuation into the highest levels of American government 
and policy represented, up to that time, the ultimate achievement of the American think 
tank.     
It is important to realize that even BMD, a subject so indelibly connected to 
Ronald Reagan, was not a concept unique to that administration.  Edward Teller 
discussed defensive possibilities as early as late 1945 after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bombings when many were asserting that there could be no defense against the atomic 
bomb.236  The United States first developed actual Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defenses 
as early as 1963.  By the mid 1960s Soviet developments in ABM weapons and a 
possible Chinese nuclear program increased calls in the United States for a real ABM 
system.  By the late 1960s the United States had a small ABM system mainly designed to 
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protect ICBM sites 237  This system was further limited by the 1972 ABM treaty, and by 
1975 Congress discontinued the program was discontinued altogether.     
However, BMD research and development continued, and many of the systems 
and technologies that would reach the experimental stage in the mid and late 1980s were 
discussed as part of Senate hearings on Department of Defense appropriations in March 
of 1980.238  This discussion of BMD, led by Major General Grayson Tate, BMD program 
manager, illustrates the context in which missile defense was considered at that time.  
Specifically, the technology was seen as a way to address the ever present issue of ICBM 
silo vulnerability.  In particular the discussion related to the protection of the MX and 
Minuteman missile sites.239  In other words, these proposed systems were integrated 
closely with offensive strategic systems to ensure their survivability and therefore 
enhance the credibility of the nation’s nuclear deterrence which, in turn, preserved the 
validity of MAD.   
The important point here, then, is two fold: (1) Missile defense, and its related 
technology and applications, did not originate with Ronald Reagan.  It was a national 
security issue as far back as the Kennedy administration.  Like the strategic 
modernization program, Reagan’s adoption of the idea was just that, an adoption.  (2)  
The important difference was that, like strategic modernization, Reagan made missile 
defense a part of his actual political platform and agenda, and shifted its context from the 
MAD paradigm to his own vision of arms control.     
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The link Reagan drew between SDI and arms control or, more accurately, arms 
reduction, has not always been readily apparent because the debate over the issue focused 
so disproportionately over the “militarization of space” concerns.  Reagan’s address to 
the nation on March 23, 1983 actually dealt mostly with more conventional matters of 
national security and defense.  The subject of missile defenses constituted only the last 
few minutes of the address, after acknowledging the value of the nation’s traditional 
strategic nuclear deterrent and the need to maintain this long standing force.  In the last 
section of the speech Reagan segued into the simultaneous topic of SDI and arms 
reduction.  The language of these last eleven paragraphs speak of the need to “lower the 
level of all arms” and the desire to “achieve major arms reduction” and “save lives.”240  
For Reagan, SDI was “a vision of the future” that would provide “measures that are 
defensive” and would be worth any investment to “free the world from the threat of 
nuclear war” and “pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons 
themselves.”241   
Reagan insisted that nuclear weapons not be a part of SDI, and he did not want to 
send them into space.242  Clearly, he viewed these technologies as a purely defensive 
solution to the problem of the very existence of nuclear weapons themselves.  In his own 
memoirs his discussion of SDI is linked to his explanation of the “zero-zero” proposal 
related to the negotiations on reducing Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF).243  As 
Lawrence Freedman puts it, “SDI sought a Great Escape from the nuclear dilemma” and, 
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as Freedman also points out, Reagan would eventually promise to share the secrets of this 
“Great Escape” with the Soviets in exchange for the drastic arms reductions he wanted.244  
With SDI Reagan was, “not attempting a new move in the prolonged game of nuclear 
deterrence but seeking to terminate the game.  The objective was not to protect vital 
military assets but society itself.”245   
Aside from lofty rhetoric and visions, the actual historical record on the matter 
shows that during the Reagan administration all actual testing and experimentation of 
SDI technology, and those related to it, were in fact non-nuclear and involved research 
into either “kinetic energy” weapons that impact directly with the target, or laser weapons 
powered with chemicals.246  More importantly, this reality about Reagan’s vision of SDI 
as an arms control measure addresses what Coral Bell identified as the “Reagan 
Paradox,” the seeming discontinuity between the administration’s declaratory signals 
(what they say) and their operational signals (what they actually do).247  Moreover, it is 
this very paradox that provides an interesting link between Jimmy Carter and Ronald 
Reagan.   
The paradox can be expressed as a question : How is it that a seemingly right 
wing, anti-communist, defense hawk could, after approximately four years in office, 
switch almost seamlessly into becoming perhaps the most successful arms control 
president in American history?  Likewise, how did a seemingly dovish, moralistic, liberal 
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internationalist, like Jimmy Carter, end up laying the groundwork for the nation’s most 
expensive peacetime military modernizations ever, with a return to a Truman type policy 
of hard line containment?   
Bell suggests the answer to both with a French saying: “The soup is never eaten 
as hot as it is cooked.”  Or in other words, the “hot soup” of declaratory policy emerges 
from the ideological “cooks” who prepare it, but is later cooled by the “breath of 
pragmatism before it is served up as policy.”248  For Carter, that breath of pragmatism 
resulted from changes in the concerns and attitudes in American society, the rise of neo-
conservatism, and Soviet adventurism abroad and their intransigence on arms control.  
For Reagan, it was a combination of his own abhorrence of the MAD doctrine, a genuine 
desire for arms reduction, and a growing concern over the danger of nuclear war by the 
American public.  In sum, a basic fact that connected the two presidents was that both 
believed sincerely in arms reduction and peace, but approached that goal with different 
strategies which were subject to evolving social and political forces.  A final subject to 
consider here in this examination of continuums, changes, and links between the two 
administrations is the issue of intermediate range nuclear weapons and how that issue 
came full circle by the mid 1980s.   
In 1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy a new mobile, solid fueled, MIRVed, 
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the SS-20.  The missile carried three 
warheads and with its short flight time and range could hit nearly any important NATO 
target in Europe.  SALT I did not cover this type of intermediate range missile and 
Carter, not considering them a serious threat to Western Europe, did not include the 
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missile as part of SALT II discussions.249  Many Europeans, in particular the West 
Germans, disagreed, and in the fall of 1977 West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
urged the U.S. to deploy its own intermediate range weapons to offset this new threat.  In 
January of 1979, Carter worked out a “two track” agreement with the major NATO 
nations (Britain, France, and Germany) to deploy the Pershing II IRBM and the 
Tomahawk ground launched cruise missile (GLCM).250  Simultaneously, deployments 
were linked to the promise that the United States and the Soviet Union to enter into 
negotiations aimed at limiting these very systems.251    
Actual deployments of the Pershings and GLCMs did not take place until 
December of 1983, and by that time Paul H. Nitze was called back to government service 
after his long hiatus following his resignation from the SALT II negotiating team in 1974.  
Nitze personally felt that the Pershing deployments were unnecessary and that the case 
for them, “was more political than military.”252  However, in 1981 he was asked by 
fellow CPD founder Eugene Rostow, also Reagan’s director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, to join him as part of the INF negotiating team.  By that time Nitze 
felt that there was no other choice than to proceed with the two track policy.  The reason 
was the need to hold the NATO alliance together and not repeat Carter’s mistake with the 
neutron bomb by being indecisive. 253   
 Nitze, and his involvement in the INF talks in some ways personifies and 
explains the threads of continuity between the Carter and Reagan administrations.  Nitze 
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was a CPD member, and certainly an anti-communist, but his opposition to SALT and 
détente was not based on a desire for more nuclear weapons and superpower tension.  He 
supported the idea of arms reduction and peaceful relations.  His disagreement rather had 
always been over treaties and agreements that put the United States at a disadvantage 
both militarily and in any subsequent negotiations.  In sum, he had always believed in the 
“negotiation from strength” concept that was so central to Reagan’s Soviet policy.      
However, it is exactly this concept that falls within the realm of the “borderline 
signals,” between declaratory and operational, that Coral Bell discusses.  Borderline 
signals may move from the first category to the second within a matter of years.254  While 
still in their ambiguous transitional stage, borderline signals can be interpreted by an 
adversary depending on the nature, and conviction of how those signals are 
communicated.  As Bell points out “negotiation from strength” works both sides of a 
psychological street, it seeks peace, but caters to the desire by a society for safety and 
security and, “produced a greater tolerance of negotiation, simply by promoting renewed 
national self assurance.”255  The Carter administration’s fundamental mistake was its 
failure to realize the increasing need for this self assurance during the “decade of 
nightmares” that was the 1970s.256   
Reagan’s zero-zero option and SDI was just as bold, and seemingly unrealistic, as 
Carter’s March 1977 proposal, and was likewise rejected and criticized both domestically 
and abroad.  However, the INF treaty, concluded in December 1987, in which Nitze also 
played a role, did constitute a major breakthrough in nuclear arms reduction.  An entire 
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class of nuclear weaponry was eliminated, and the path was opened for further reductions 
in strategic weapons that would lead to a 25 to 30 percent reduction in offensive 
warheads.257  By that time, the American public had evolved to that  combination of 
confidence and concern that made those reductions palatable.  Furthermore, the spectrum 
of change in Soviet/American relations and policy had finally come full circle to the point 
of realizing Carter’s dreams of peace and arms control.     
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CONCLUSION 
Regardless of how much admirers of Ronald Reagan may wish to believe that he 
alone, among all other Cold War U.S. presidents, led the free world to victory over Soviet 
communism, the historical record does not support this belief.  This thesis has been, in 
part, an attempt to explain why that belief is false.  In the Cold War, the United States 
faced a unique situation in its history: a roughly fifty year period of continuous 
confrontation with an adversary equal in military strength and political influence.  That 
adversary sought to promote a political and social vision of the future that was 
completely at odds with the principles on which the United States was founded.  
Therefore, as much as many people at the time, and still a few today, wanted to believe 
the Cold War did not “end” at any point, even temporarily, until the Soviet government’s 
dissolution in 1991.   
Accordingly then, American presidents out of necessity had to pass the struggle to 
their successors like runners in a relay race, or players in a game of “hot potato,” each 
one having figure the best way to handle it as best they knew.  This is not to suggest that 
a given president played no unique role on their own.  Indeed, in the case of Ronald 
Reagan, a strong case can be made that his efforts hastened the fall of a regime that 
perhaps could have limped along for another ten years or more, all the while subjecting 
its citizens to a life of stifling repression, fear, and a miserable standard of living.  
Likewise, it is fair to say that the Helsinki Final Act under Ford, and Jimmy Carter’s 
human rights focus, initiated the cracks in the foundation of the Soviet empire by 
emboldening civil rights movements in the communist world.  This in turn created the 
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support base for such important anti-communist freedom fighters like Pope John Paul II 
and Lech Walesa.   
However, a continuous confrontation produced continuities in policy in which 
changes evolved over time in a much more subtle and nuanced manner than many have 
chosen to recognize.  This evolution mirrored the changing currents of thought and 
attitude among the American public, and its foreign policy intelligentsia.  The existence 
of these two factors, and Soviet aggression, were constant influences on the government’s 
decision making, with the latter gaining power and influence and the Cold War 
progressed.  These evolving constants accounted for much of the continuities and 
evolutions examined in this thesis.  
The modern American think tank, as it exists today, was born from the felt need 
to bring together the smartest minds available, and marshal their brilliance and creativity 
to advise elected decision makers in the complex game of politics, psychology, and high 
technology that the Cold War represented.  By the 1970s however, many think tanks had 
become decidedly partisan political institutions and their membership often overlapped 
with that of political special interest groups.  This political orientation gave many 
American think tanks, particularly the conservative ones, a greater degree of focus to 
their energies.  This would result in one of the modern think tank’s greatest 
accomplishments; the thorough insinuation by the Hoover Institute, into the highest levels 
of U.S. government policy making.   
These facts suggest some interesting questions for all Americans to consider.  
How should the influence of organizations like Hoover and the Committee on the Present 
Danger on American foreign policy be considered?  As a net positive or negative?  What 
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are the implications when so many non-elected people have such sway in such matters?  
Who then really makes and shapes the nation’s foreign policy?      
Another major subject of this thesis is the influence that social movements and 
public opinion have on policy making.  This can perhaps be viewed at bit more positively 
as an affirmation of the effectiveness of America’s democratic system to affect change 
and direction in policy even between election cycles.  However, here as well, there are 
similar important questions to be asked.  To what degree does the American public make 
and shape foreign policy?  As democratic as this may seem, was it the public zeitgeist 
that produced the often inconsistent and ambiguous nature of U.S. diplomacy?  Did this 
ambiguity and inconsistency unnecessarily slow diplomatic progress more than otherwise 
would have been the case if a given president had been unfettered by public pressure 
concerns? 
Overall, it is important to remember that none of these factors exist and exert their 
influence in a vacuum.  As Robert Higgs points out, “One is not justified, however, in 
regarding public opinion as entirely autonomous or spontaneous.  There occurs a 
ceaseless contest over the determination of public opinion, and in this contest, defense 
policymakers, whose preferences may differ from those of the mass public, occupy a 
powerful position.”258  In short, the United States’ foreign policy was shaped from a 
confluence of various forces.  However, as one saying goes, the American people have 
always managed to eventually get what they wanted, or deserved, depending on one’s 
point of view.                 
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